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“Intentional Acts Cannot Be Accidents”  
A Critique of a Legal Error 
 
James E. Scheuermann 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It has rightly been said that “[t]here have been few insurance words 
that have provoked more controversy and litigation than the word 
‘accident.’”1  The debate on the meaning of “accident” as it appears in the 
insuring agreements of third-party liability policies is at least as old as 
Justice Cardozo’s classic insurance coverage opinion in Messersmith v. 
American Fidelity Co.,2 published almost a century ago.  For the past three 
decades this debate has taken the form of argument over whether the term 
“accident” as it appears in the insuring agreements of many liability 
policies requires that the act causing the complained-of injurious effects be 
accidental (that is, not intended or fortuitous) or whether the term requires 
only that the complained-of injurious effects be accidental.  There is a vast 
sea of case law and scholarly commentary on this debate with no final 
resolution in sight. 
In this article, I attempt to advance the debate through a critique of the 
principal rule of decision adopted by the school that holds that the term 
“accident” in the insuring agreements of occurrence- and accident-based 
liability policies requires that the act causing the complained-of injurious 
effects be fortuitous.  The guiding rule adopted by this school is that 
intentional acts cannot be accidents.  To state the rule more fully: If an 
insured intended to do an act that caused (or allegedly caused) harm to the 
interests of a third party, then the intentional nature of that act means that it 
 
  James E. Scheuermann is a partner in K&L Gates LLP, where he represents policyholders in 
insurance coverage matters.  Mr. Scheuermann received his J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law (1989) and his Ph.D. (Philosophy) from the University of Chicago (1982).  This article 
does not necessarily reflect the views of any client of K&L Gates or the firm itself.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Sara N. Brown, Ali J. Parker, and Laura K. Veith.  
The author further acknowledges many helpful editorial comments on earlier drafts of this article from 
Professor Kenneth S. Abraham, Professor Erik S. Knutsen, Ms. Brown, Paul E. del Vecchio, Paul C. 
Fuener, and David F. McGonigle. 
 1. 4-23 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 23.4, at 16 (2013). 
 2. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432 (N.Y. Ct. Apps. 1921). 
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cannot be an “accident” within the insuring agreement of an occurrence- or 
accident-based third-party liability policy, even if the insured did not 
expect or intend the injurious effects of which the third party complains.  I 
shall refer to this rule as “the Maxim.”  I argue that the Maxim is a 
fundamental legal error, and that courts should reject the Maxim as a 
general rule of decision in liability insurance coverage disputes.  In place of 
the Maxim, I propose an alternative rule that leads to fairer resolution of 
liability insurance coverage disputes and a more sound insurance law 
jurisprudence.  That rule is grounded in the language of the salient insuring 
agreements and a pluralistic theory of action that permits an act to be both 
intentional and accidental. 
Nationwide, only a minority of courts has adopted the Maxim as a rule 
of decision in coverage actions.  Nonetheless, it has been adopted by 
appellate courts in ten states, including the appellate courts of California, 
Georgia, Texas, and Washington, and has been employed as a rule of 
decision by numerous federal courts.  Moreover, the Maxim has been 
applied in a wide range of coverage disputes, including those involving 
breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, copyright infringement, 
faulty workmanship, forgery, termination of employment, disability 
discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, the giving of 
professional advice, libel, civil conspiracy, common horseplay and pranks, 
self-defense, assault, battery, false imprisonment, conversion, trespass, 
sexual assault, and refusal to remove a private nuisance.  Further, the term 
“accident” in the insuring agreements at issue in these cases and at the heart 
of the Maxim is contained in tens of thousands of policies issued to 
policyholders over many decades.  These policies include standard form 
Commercial General Liability policies, which are issued to commercial and 
not-for-profit enterprises, homeowner’s policies, automobile policies, 
employers’ liability policies, and premises liability policies. 
Every participant in insurance coverage disputes in which the Maxim 
is or could be advanced has a real interest in rectifying this legal error.  The 
interest of policyholders is clear: courts often employ this rule to deny 
coverage to which policyholders are entitled.  Insurers also have an interest 
in correcting this error, at least in the long run, since that would result in 
greater predictability in risk assessment and policy pricing, and perhaps 
fewer coverage battles with policyholders.  The judiciary as well has an 
interest in correcting this erroneous rule.  Judicial application of this rule 
often has been ad hoc and grounded in unjustifiable assumptions, which 
creates an appearance of judicial arbitrariness and, in some instances, 
results-oriented jurisprudence. 
After a review of the insuring agreements at issue and the current 
debate as to the meaning of “accident” (in Section II), I shall focus my 
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critique of the Maxim on two bases that the courts often contend justify the 
rule.  First, many courts find the justification for the Maxim in the meaning 
of the key insuring term “accident” and the fortuity requirement that is 
essential to insurance.  In Section III.A, I argue that this view reflects a 
superficial interpretation of “accident” and of the fortuity requirement.  The 
Maxim is not a direct implication of the definition of “accident.”  The 
fortuity requirement, properly understood, does not require the adoption of 
the Maxim as a rule of decision and is consistent with the alternative view 
that an act can be both intentional and accidental at the same time.  Second, 
as I discuss in Section III.B., courts often attempt to justify the Maxim 
through a theory of intentional action that assumes that an actor always 
exercises such complete control over his action that it completely conforms 
to his intention and no aspect of the act is a matter of chance or uncertainty 
 that is, there is nothing in the act that can be an accident.  Thus, an act is 
either intentional or accidental, but never both at the same time.  I am 
aware of no court or commentator that has attempted to justify this 
fundamental assumption.  Yet as a general principle detached from any 
evidentiary predicate, it clearly needs justification.  It is contrary to 
common language and experience and a jurisprudential and philosophical 
tradition stretching back to Aristotle.  Broadly stated, the problem with this 
complete control assumption is not that it is never true, but rather that it is 
not true for all actions, and specifically, is not true for many actions that are 
the subjects of liability insurance coverage disputes. 
The alternative, and better reasoned, view is that an act can have 
multiple properties.  Those properties of the act that reflect the actor’s 
control over his act, such that the act conforms to his intention to that 
extent, allow us to describe the action as intentional, while those properties 
that reflect his lack of control, such that the act did not conform to his 
intent to some extent, allow us to describe the same act as an accident.  
Accordingly, if there is a proper evidentiary basis, an act can be truly 
described as both intentional and accidental.  (I am intentionally grilling the 
hamburgers and accidentally burning them to a crisp — both in the very 
same act.  I intend to clear timber on my property but accidentally clear 
timber on my neighbor’s property (because of a mistaken belief as to the 
location of the property line) — both in the very same act.)  I discuss this 
alternative pluralistic theory of intentional action in Section III.B.2.  In 
Section IV, I use coverage disputes in which the insured’s action did not 
completely conform to her intention, either because she acted intentionally 
but under a mistaken belief or because she improperly executed her 
intentional action, to further illustrate the fundamental problems with the 
Maxim and to demonstrate the merits of a pluralistic view of action in 
addressing insurance coverage disputes.  I show in Section V how the 
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alternative pluralistic theory of action I propose here is consistent with the 
fortuity requirement.  Finally, in Section VI, I articulate an alternative to 
the Maxim and show its grounding in salient policy language and a 
pluralistic theory of action. 
A word on method: for all that has been written about intentional acts 
by courts deciding insurance coverage disputes and by insurance law 
scholars and commentators, those discussions by and large have proceeded 
on the basis of broad generalizations about the nature of intentional action 
and little careful analysis of the concept as applied to insurance coverage 
issues.  In this respect, insurance law stands in a position roughly 
analogous to antitrust and tort law in the 1970s, before the application of 
the concepts of microeconomic theory to these fields.  Just as the 
application of microeconomic theory has revolutionized our thinking about 
these areas of law, insurance law stands to benefit from the application of 
philosophical theories of action and, in any event, if not these, of more 
rigorous analysis of the concept of intentional action.  This article attempts 
to take a step in that direction, with appropriate sensitivity to the 
possibilities open to, and the constraints imposed on, any such theory by 
the policy language at issue and the insurance concept of fortuity. 
 
II. THE SALIENT INSURING AGREEMENTS AND THE FORTUITY 
DEBATE: ACTS AND EFFECTS 
 
The insuring agreements of occurrence- and accident-based third-
party liability policies typically provide coverage for bodily injury and 
property damage caused by an “occurrence” or an “accident.”  This 
insuring language is commonly found in standard form Commercial 
General Liability (“CGL”) polices, homeowner’s policies, automobile 
policies, employer’s liability policies, and premises liability policies.3 
 
 3. Homeowner’s and automobile liability policies generally track the “occurrence” or “accident” 
language of the CGL policy.  S. J. MILLER, MILLER’S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 
202 (6th ed. 2014) (in the standard form homeowner’s policy, “‘Occurrence’ means an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which 
results, during the policy period in:  a. ‘Bodily injury’; or ‘Property damage.’”) (citing ISO Form HO 00 
03 05 11); see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Salahutdin, 815 F. Supp. 1309, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 
(homeowner’s policy provided coverage for bodily injury and property damage “arising from an 
accident”); MILLER, supra note 3, at 3 (in a standard form automobile liability policy, “[w]e will pay 
damages for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ for which any ‘insured’ becomes legally responsible 
because of an auto accident”; “accident” is undefined) (citing ISO FORM PP 00 01 01 05); Grange Ins. 
Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 123, 124 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (automobile policy).  Other third-party 
liability policies, such as employer’s liability policies and premises liability policies, are also accident-
based.  See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324, 1333 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(employer’s liability policy provided coverage for damages “because of bodily injury by accident or 
disease.”); Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Am. Int’l Surplus Line Ins. Co., No. C038514, 2003 
WL 205126, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (premises liability policy provided coverage for bodily injury 
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In the current CGL form issued by the Insurance Services Office, Inc. 
(“ISO”),4 the insuring language provides that the insurer will pay for bodily 
injury or property damage “caused by an ‘occurrence.’”  “Occurrence” is 
defined to mean “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions.”5  None of the ISO 
occurrence-based policy forms contained or contain a definition of 
“accident.” 
Case law is replete with statements that “accident” as found in liability 
policy insuring agreements means, implies, or is synonymous with 
fortuity.6  It is blackletter California law, for example, that “[a]n accident 
occurs when the event leading to the injury was ‘unintended by the insured 
and a matter of fortuity.’”7  Commentators tend to agree that “accident” as 
used in liability policies is synonymous with fortuity.8  Beyond this 
agreement, however, there is substantial debate between and among 
policyholders, insurers, courts, and commentators on the issue of what must 
be fortuitous or “accidental” under CGL insuring language. 
The principal line of demarcation in this debate is between (a) those 
who hold that the term “accident” in the insuring agreement only requires 
 
“resulting from an accident”). 
 4. ISO is an insurance industry organization that issues standard forms for many types of policies, 
including the CGL policy.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993). 
5.  MILLER, supra note 3, at GL-3 (citing ISO Form CG 00 01 04 13).  ISO moved the 
exclusionary language that coverage is not available for bodily injury or property damage “expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured,” which was part of the definition of “occurrence” in the 
1966 and 1973 ISO CGL forms, to the exclusions section in 1986.  The exclusion provides that “[t]his 
insurance does not apply to . . . ‘bodily injury’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” 
 Id. at GL-4 (citing ISO Form CG 00 01 04 13). 
For a discussion of the salient history of the ISO CGL forms, see, e.g., 4 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE 2D § 23.4 at 521-26 (E. M. Holmes ed., 1998) [hereinafter HOLMES’ APPLEMAN]; James M. 
Fischer, Accidental or Willful?:  The California Insurance Conundrum, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 69, 
73–76 (2014); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 74 (Wis. 2004). 
 6. See, e.g., Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 
888, 898 (Pa. 2006) (“The key term in the ordinary definition of ‘accident’ is ‘unexpected.’  This 
implies a degree of fortuity . . . .”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E. 2d 
687, 692 (N.Y. Ct. Apps. 2002) (“[T]he requirement of a fortuitous loss is a necessary element of 
insurance policies based on either an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’”); Reisig v. Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 
1066, 1069-70 (Wyo. 1994) (“accident” means “fortuitous circumstance, event . . . .”); McAllister v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 474 A.2d 1033, 1036 (N.H. 1984) (“[F]ortuity [is] implied by reference to accident     
. . . .”).  In turn, “fortuity” is sometimes defined in terms of “accident”:  “an insurer will not pay for a 
loss unless the loss is ‘fortuitous,’ meaning that the loss must be accidental in some sense.”  1 NEW 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 1.05[2][a] at 1-40–1-41 (J. E. Thomas et al. eds., 
April 2015) [hereinafter, APPLEMAN LIBRARY EDITION]; see also id. at § 1.05[2][c] at 1–51. 
 7. See, e.g., Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exch., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 
Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)). 
8. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Fortuity Clauses in Liability Insurance: Solving Coverage Dilemmas 
for Intentional and Criminal Conduct, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 73, 83 n. 22 (2011) (“‘accidents’ . . . are 
necessarily fortuitous events”); Fischer, supra note 5, at 72 (“It is fundamental to insurance that 
coverage is extended to accidental or fortuitous losses.”). 
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that the injurious effects must be fortuitous; “accident,” in focusing on the 
fortuity of the loss, has a meaning identical or similar to the exclusionary 
language for losses that are “expected or intended from the standpoint of 
the insured” (the “Injurious Effects Only” school) and (b) those who hold 
that “accident” requires that the act that causes a third party’s injuries must 
be fortuitous, independent of any fortuity requirement as to the effects of 
that act (the “Causative Acts” school).  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
framed the debate succinctly: “The key interpretive question is what should 
be deemed ‘accidental’: the act or the injuries resulting from the act?”9 
It is useful to flesh out the positions of these two schools a bit more 
fully.  The Injurious Effects Only school is represented in these examples: 
 
 In a coverage action arising out of the destruction of part of a house 
by an employee of the insured, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held: “[A]n 
accident ‘denotes something that does not result from a plan, design, or 
intent on the part of the insured.  The damage to the [claimant’s] property 
was unexpected and unintended by the insured.’  It was not the plan, 
design, or intent of the insured.  Therefore, the fortuity requirement in the 
definition of accident is satisfied.”10 
 In a coverage action arising out of the insured’s public statements, 
which allegedly caused emotional distress to the claimant, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that state’s long-standing rule that: “the 
accidental nature of an occurrence is determined by analyzing whether the 
alleged wrongdoer intended or expected to cause an injury.  If not, then the 
resulting injury is ‘accidental,’ even if the act that caused the injury was 
intentional.”11 
 “In the liability context, the [fortuity] examination is whether an 
insured intends to cause a specific resulting harm, or knew with substantial 
certainty its conduct would cause the resulting harm.  If it did not, the 
resulting injury may be judged accidental, even if the act that caused the 
injury was intentional.”12 
  
 
 
 9. Vorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1263 (N.J. 1992).  For discussions of the 
positions in this debate, see, e.g., R. KEETON & A.I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.4(d) (2d ed. 1988); 3 
NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 30.07[4] (L. Martinez et al. eds., 2014) 
(discussing the debate) [hereinafter APPLEMAN PRACTICE GUIDE ]; 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d §§ 
126:27, 126:30 (S. Plitt et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the debate and citing numerous cases); 9A COUCH 
ON INSURANCE 3d § 129:3 (discussing the debate and citing numerous cases).  
 10. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenway Contracting, Inc., 240 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Ky. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
 11. Vorhees, 607 A.2d at 1264. 
 12. APPLEMAN PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 9, § 1.06[3] at 1–18. 
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 The alternative view of the Causative Acts school is reflected in 
statements such as: 
 
 “where the insured intended all of the acts that resulted in the 
victim’s injury, the event may not be deemed an ‘accident’ merely because 
the insured did not intend to cause the injury.”13 
 “the term “accident” refers to the insured’s intent to commit the act 
giving rise to liability, as opposed to his or her intent to cause the 
consequences of that act . . . .”14 
 “accident” as used in the insuring agreement refers “to [the 
insured’s] action, and not to whatever unintended damages flowed from 
that act.”15 
 the conduct of a “peeping Tom” “is, on its face, intentional.  It is not 
accidental conduct and would not constitute an occurrence under the 
policy.  Voluntary and intentional acts, even though they may result in 
injury which is unexpected, unforeseen and unintended, are not covered by 
the policy.”16 
 
As suggested by the preceding quotes, the Maxim — the rule that 
intentional acts cannot be accidents — is a proposition adopted by 
proponents of the Causative Acts school.  It declares as a general rule that 
intentional acts are not within the coverage of occurrence- and accident-
based insuring agreements because they cannot be accidents, and, 
accordingly, one need not reach the questions of whether the complained-of 
injuries were caused by the act in question and whether those injuries are 
within the insuring agreement (e.g., whether they are covered bodily injury 
or property damage).  The Maxim has been applied by appellate courts in 
ten states and by numerous federal courts in a wide variety of coverage 
disputes.17  I shall argue below that the Maxim is a legal error because it is 
 
 13. Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 14. Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 403–04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  See also id. 
at 403 (“The overwhelming weight of California authority holds that the term ‘accident’ refers to the 
[nonintentional] nature of the act giving rise to liability, not to the insured’s intent to cause harm. . . .”). 
 15. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. OmniBank, 812 So. 2d 196, 200 (Miss. 2002) (internal citation 
omitted). 
16. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Murphy, 896 F. Supp. 645, 648 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Texas 
cases). 
17. For state cases,  see Armstrong v. Sec. Ins. Group, 288 So. 2d 134, 136 (Ala. 1973); Hartford 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 928 So. 2d 1006, 1013 (Ala. 2005) (adopting the Maxim 
on the evidentiary record); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986); Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Collin, 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 400–01 (citing and quoting numerous California cases); O’Dell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 478 S.E.2d 418, 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Rucker v. Colum. Nat’l Ins. Co., 705 S.E 2d 270, 
274 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moulton, 464 So. 2d 507, 509–10 (Miss. 1985); U.S. Fid. 
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not implied by the term “accident” in the salient insuring agreements, is not 
required by the fortuity requirement, and rests on an untenable view of 
intentional action. 
 
III. THE MAXIM 
 
The Maxim expresses the proposition that intentional acts cannot be 
(or are not) accidents, that the concepts of intentional act and accident are 
contradictory or unalterably opposed in some sense.  Under long-standing 
California law, for example, “[a]n accident . . . is never present when a 
deliberate act is performed unless some additional unexpected, independent 
and unforeseen happening produces or brings about the injury or death”18; 
“[i]t is fundamental that allegations of intentional wrongdoing do not allege 
an ‘accident’”19; and “deliberate conduct is not an ‘accident’ or 
‘occurrence’ irrespective of the insured’s state of mind [as to the 
consequences of his act].”20  The appellate courts of Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming have adopted similar or identical rules.21  For some courts, the 
 
& Guar. Co. v. OmniBank, 812 So. 2d 196, 200 (Miss. 2002); Blair v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 167 
P.3d 888, 891 (Mont. 2007); Farr v. Designer Phosphate & Premix Int’l, Inc., 570 N.W.2d 320, 325 
(Neb. 1997); Foxley & Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 277 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Neb. 1979); Gene & 
Harvey Builders, Inc., v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 1986); Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. 
v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1973); Devoe v. Great Am. Ins., 50 S.W.3d 567, 572 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2001); Brazoswood Nat’l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., No. 14-97-00129-CV, 1998 WL 
30166, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App., Jan. 29, 1998); Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 123, 127 (Wash. 
1989) (en banc); Stuart v. Weisflog’s Showroom Gallery, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 448, 456–61 (Wis. 2008); 
Everson v. Lorenz, 695 N.W.2d 298, 304–05 (Wis. 2005); Reisig v. Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 1066, 
1070 (Wyo. 1994). 
The status of the Maxim in Indiana is uncertain.  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 
1279 (Ind. 2006), may have effectively overruled the leading Indiana case adopting the Maxim — Jim 
Barna Log Sys. Midwest, Inc. v. Gen. Casualty Ins. Co., 791 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) — but it 
did not do so expressly. 
For federal cases, see Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673–74 (D. Md. 2012) 
(applying California law); Morton v. Safeco Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying 
California law); Daniels v. Allstate Ins. Co., No.14-CV-00824-LHK, 2014 WL 2536400, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. June 6, 2014) (applying California law); SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 
1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law); Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 
1364–65 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (applying Georgia law); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McBrayer, 801 
F.2d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying South Dakota law); Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Murphy, 896 
F. Supp. 645, 647–48 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (applying Texas law).  See also A. WINDT, 3 INSURANCE 
CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 11:3, at 11-38-39 nn.10 (2013) [hereinafter WINDT] (citing numerous cases). 
 18. Merced Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (emphasis added) [full cite?]; Collin, 26 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 404 (quoting Mendez); see also James M. Fischer, The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of 
Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 95, 108 (1990) (“In California, the term ‘accident’ has been deemed to be the antithesis 
of an intended act.”). 
 19. Collin, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400–01 (citing and quoting numerous California cases). 
 20. Id. at 404. 
 21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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Maxim is grounded in dictionary or other common definitions of 
“accident” and little to nothing more.  A second principal rationale for the 
Maxim is an understanding of the nature of intentional action.  I will 
consider each of these purported justifications in turn. 
 
A. THE ARGUMENT FROM DEFINITIONS OF “ACCIDENT” 
 
1. “Accident” 
 
Courts that find the rationale for the Maxim in dictionary definitions 
or other common meanings of “accident” typically recite one or more 
definitions of “accident,” which often include synonyms such as 
unintended or undesigned, and then conclude from that definition alone that 
“[a]n intentional act is not an ‘accident’ within the plain meaning of the 
word.”22  On this view, actions are analogous to geometrical figures, in that 
by definition any given geometrical figure (e.g., a square) cannot also be 
another geometrical figure (e.g., a triangle, circle, or any other figure).  Just 
as it is nonsensical or self-contradictory to speak of a square circle, so too, 
the champions of the Maxim hold, it is nonsensical or self-contradictory to 
speak of an intentional-accidental act.  This semantic argument is a 
nonstarter for at least three reasons. 
First, the term “accident” as used in liability coverage case law is so 
broad and flexible23 that “X is an accident,” does not necessarily imply “X 
is not an intentional act,” and conversely, “X is an intentional act” does not 
necessarily imply “X is not an accident.”  Courts that draw those 
conclusions tend to focus on one part or parts of the definition of 
“accident,” (e.g., unintended, undesigned), while ignoring other possible 
definitions that do not directly contradict “intentional act” (e.g., 
“unexpected, unforeseen . . . happening or consequence . . . .”).24  More 
 
 22. See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); 
accord Quan v. Truck Ins. Exch., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Royal Globe Ins. Co. 
v. Whitaker, 226 Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (Cal Ct. App. 1986); Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 
540, 553 (Md. 1996) (dissenting opinion); see also, Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 
1363 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (quoting definitions of “accident” from Georgia case law and a statute, and 
stating “‘Accident’ and ‘intention’ are thus interpreted as converse terms”). 
 23. Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881, 884 (Cal. 1959) (“[n]o 
all-inclusive definition of the word ‘accident’ can be given.”); accord N.W. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. 
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 356, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Botts v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. 
Co., 585 P.2d 657, 660 (Or. 1978) (no one “all-encompassing definition of ‘accident’” is applicable to 
all circumstances). 
 24. Collin, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403.  See the related debate on whether “expected” and “intended” 
as used in the “expected and intended” exclusion have the same meaning.  James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., 
Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries 
Intended or Expected by the Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 §§ 4[a]–4[b] (2014).  For courts holding that 
they do not have the same meaning, see, e.g., Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 
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generally, in geometry, each definition is so precise as to define only one 
geometric object and to exclude all others.  In insurance law and common 
language, “accident” is defined by numerous terms (e.g., unexpected, 
unforeseen, fortuitous), only some of which may be inconsistent with 
“intentional act.” 
Even ignoring this first problem, the pick-and-choose strategy does 
not yield a valid inference.  “Accident” and “intentional act” are 
contradictory only if one assumes several more additional premises to be 
true.  Consider just the issue of point of view.  Some courts define 
“accident” from the point of view of the injured third party.  Thus, for 
example, “accident” has been defined as “a casualty  something out of 
the usual course of events and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly 
and without design of the person injured . . . .”25  If the point of view 
explicit or implicit in the concept of accident is not that of the actor 
engaging in the intentional act, there is no necessary opposition or 
contradiction between intentional action and accident.  The insured can act 
intentionally and the injured third party can view that act as an accident 
without any contradiction.  A wholly unsuspecting victim of an intentional 
act that is injurious may reasonably view the act (and his injuries) as an 
accident or matter of fortuity (“it was a random car accident”).  Point of 
view is also an issue when the insured is liable for the actions of a third 
party, as in cases of strict or vicarious liability.26  To be clear, the point here 
is not that the perspective of the victim is the “correct” point of view for 
purposes of interpreting “accident” in liability insuring agreements.27  
 
(Me. 1981); Northwestern Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979); State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Jenkins, 382 N.W.2d 796 (Mich. App. 1985); see also J. W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE 
CONTRACT DISPUTES § 1.05[a], at 1-38 (2004) (the better view is that these terms have different 
meanings, in part because dictionaries define them differently); 1 J. W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 
134, at 415 (Stevens & Haynes 1902) (“Intention does not necessarily involve expectation.  I may 
intend a result which I will know to be extremely improbable.”). 
 25. Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 334 P.2d 881, 884 (Cal. 1959).  See also 
Farr v. Designer Phosphate & Premix Int’l Inc., 570 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Neb. 1997) (“accident” includes 
“any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected 
thereby.”); Reisig v. Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 1066, 1069–70 (Wyo. 1994) (defining “accident” as a 
fortuitous event from the perspective of the injured third party); 16-117 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 
LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 117.4, at 49 (2013) [hereinafter, APPLEMAN ARCHIVE ]. 
 26. APPLEMAN LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 6, § 1.05[2][a], at 1–42; Wayne Twp. Bd. of School 
Comm’rs v. Ind. Ins. Co, 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (intent to injure could not be 
imputed to the insured school when there was no evidence that the school expected or intended the 
principal’s misconduct or that sexual molestation was the result of the school’s intent or design); CSI 
Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 1999) (considering 
whether the point of view of the insured employer or harassing employee is the appropriate perspective 
from which to determine whether the harassment is an “accident”). 
 27. The perspective of the third party virtually always leads to the conclusion that the event or loss 
was fortuitous.  That is one reason why the majority of courts considering the issue has held that the 
perspective of the insured is the correct reference point for the fortuity inquiry.  See APPLEMAN 
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Rather, I am only arguing that if “accident” and “intentional act” contradict 
each other, they do so only if one implicitly or expressly assumes a position 
on the correct point of view being that of the insured, and that requires 
argument.  That position is not necessarily part of the definition of 
“accident.” 
Finally, to approach the purported inconsistency from the other side, 
what is it about the concept of intentional action that renders it inconsistent 
with “accident”?  On one commonly held theory of action, in an intentional 
action the actor desires to bring about some state of affairs and has correct 
beliefs about all or most of the material circumstances of her action.28  So, 
for example, Mary wants to go home after work, and she believes 
(correctly) that the 61C bus passes in front of her house, so she jumps on 
the 61C bus at the end of her workday.  But suppose Mary was mistaken in 
her belief that the 61C bus would take her home.  In one and the same act, 
she intended to get on the 61C and did so, but she accidentally boarded a 
bus that went in the wrong direction.  What is the argument that shows that 
proposition to be self-contradictory?  No court that has adopted the Maxim 
has offered one, although courts frequently declare that an actor’s acting on 
a mistaken belief does not “transform” or change an intentional act into an 
accident.29  Consider also the view of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that an 
act of misrepresentation “requires a degree of volition inconsistent with the 
term accident.”30  If “volition” or intent is not an all-or-nothing proposition, 
as this statement suggests, then some acts may have a sufficient “degree of 
volition” such that they are intentional and yet not so much volition that 
they also cannot be truly described as “accidents.”  I explore these ideas 
further in Section IV below.  The point here is that intentional action is a 
concept that admits of different theories and one gets a contradiction 
between that concept and “accident” only by assuming some such theory, 
and not directly from the definition of “accident.” 
Appeal to common, ordinary meanings is a time-honored strategy for 
analyzing terms in liability policies31 and I am not arguing that such a 
 
LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 6, § 1.05[2][a], at 1–42; Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800, 802 
(N.H. 1986) (“Because an injury is always fortuitous to a non-consenting victim, if its accidental 
character were to be judged in relation to such a victim, virtually all instances of compensable injury 
would also be instances of accident . . . .”); Crook v. Ga. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1993) (“accident” is to be determined from point of view of insured). 
 28. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 27, 31–42, 219 (U. of Chicago Press 1978); D. 
DAVIDSON, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3-8 (Oxford U. Press 
1980).  See infra Section III.B.2.  
 29. See infra Section IV.A. 
 30. Stuart v. Weisflog’s Showroom Gallery, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 448, 458 (Wis. 2008) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 31. See, e.g., APPLEMAN PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 9, at §§ 4.07[5], 4-44–4-45 (citing cases); 
Property Cas. Co. of MCA v. Conway, 687 A.2d 729, 731 (N.J. 1997); Botts v. Hartford Acc. & 
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strategy is flawed or never appropriate to assist in the determination of the 
meaning of undefined policy terms.  Rather, I am arguing that, in the 
context of the issues under discussion here, such meanings alone do not 
justify the Maxim, as some courts have reasoned.  Moreover, common 
meanings are only one tool among many available for the interpretation of 
key policy terms and the resolution of coverage disputes.  An 
understanding of the conceptual structure of a liability insurance contract 
and its purpose as a form of liability insurance is another valuable tool.  
Courts that adopt the semantic rationale fail to consider how their 
conclusion  the Maxim  is thoroughly undermined by these less 
mechanical and more analytic interpretative tools.  An analysis of the 
fortuity requirement, which is commonly said to be implicit in the term 
“accident,”32 is a natural place to begin this less mechanical approach. 
 
2. Fortuity 
 
Because “accident” in liability insuring agreements implies or is 
synonymous with fortuity, we may apply an interpretive principle of 
charity and read the decisions adopting the semantic justification for the 
Maxim as, in effect, truncated arguments for the view that the fortuity 
requirement that is at the heart of insurance33 is inconsistent with 
intentionality, that is, the view that an intentional act necessarily lacks the 
requisite randomness, contingency, chance, or uncertainty demanded by the 
fortuity requirement.  To assess this contention, we first need to analyze the 
elements and scope of the fortuity requirement.  This subsection is devoted 
to that analysis.  In Section V, I argue that the concept of fortuity, so 
understood, is not inconsistent with intentional action. 
As an initial matter, to advance beyond the shortcomings of the 
semantic argument just discussed, the purported inconsistency between 
fortuity and intentional action cannot be generated simply by reciting 
dictionary definitions of “fortuity” as meaning “chance,” “uncertainty,” 
 
Indemn. Co., 585 P.2d 657, 660 (Or. 1978) (citing cases and authorities); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 
513 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 32. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
33. See, e.g., APPLEMAN PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 9, at § 30.07[5][a], at 3052 (“Fortuity-
randomness, chance, or risk-is inherent in the nature of all insurance and is in fact the definitive 
principle behind the concept of insurability.”); Knutsen, supra note 8, at 75 (“The basic premise behind 
insurance is that it only protects against fortuitous losses, not against losses that are certain to occur.”); 
Stempel, supra note 24, at § 1.05, at 1–33 (“insurance exists to provide indemnity for fortuitous losses 
only . . .”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 692 (N.Y. 2002) 
(“[T]he requirement of a fortuitous loss is a necessary element of insurance policies based on either an 
‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’”). 
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“contingent,” or the like.34  One could at least equally plausibly argue that a 
common, and perhaps the most common, antonym of “fortuity” is 
“certainty” (or “necessity”), not “intentional action.”35  “Intentional action” 
contradicts or is contrary to “fortuity” only if “intentional action” itself 
implies or is synonymous with “certainty” (or “necessity”).  Establishing 
that inference, if it can be established, requires argument with respect to the 
concepts of fortuity and intentional action, not mere semantics.  This is 
particularly the case because “fortuity,” like “accident,” is a flexible 
concept in the insurance case law.  It is a term that “cause[s] conceptual 
difficulties.”36 
Moreover, fortuity is a “theory-ladened” concept.  Different 
conceptions of insurance may embrace different concepts of fortuity.  A 
conception of liability-insurance-as-a-contractual-relation is likely to view 
fortuity from the perspective of the parties to the insurance contract, while 
a conception of liability-insurance-as-part-of-the-tort-compensation-system 
may view fortuity from the perspective of an injured third party.37  As 
discussed above in Section III.A.1, point of view is not a matter of 
definitional fiat, but of argument.  There is no necessary inconsistency 
between fortuity as viewed by the injured third party and the intentional 
action of the actor. 
Viewed from a liability insurance contract perspective, which is the 
perspective I shall adopt here, the concept of fortuity has two principal 
 
 34. See, e.g., Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Sturge, 684 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (equating 
fortuity with “chance”), aff’d 848 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1988); Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Linard, 498 F.2d 
556, 563 (2d Cir. 1974) (“happening by accident or chance; unplanned”) (citation omitted); Avis v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 195 S.E.2d 545, 548 (N.C. 1973) (equating “fortuity” with “chance” in first-
party property policy coverage action).  This casual appeal to dictionary definitions, without further 
understanding of the role fortuity plays in insurance, appears, in many cases, to support the criticism 
that the fortuity requirement “has been so loosely applied that it has lost is innate helpfulness to courts 
and litigants.”  Knutsen, supra note 8, at 75 (citing generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in 
Property and Liability Insurance, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 777 (2001) and Fischer, supra note 18). 
 35. Erik S. Knutsen, Fortuity Victims and the Compensation Gap: Re-envisioning Liability 
Coverage for Intentional and Criminal Conduct, 21 CONN. L.J. 209, 236 (2014) (contrasting fortuitous 
events and certain events); APPLEMAN LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 6, at § 1.05[2][b] (fortuity means 
that a loss must be uncertain). 
 36. Matter of Feinstein, 326 N.E.2d 288, 293 (N.Y. 1975) (“Terms like fortuitousness of event in 
the law, as with the word accident, have always caused conceptual difficulties . . .  In this area it is easy 
to slip into metaphysical, even validly metaphysical, distinctions.”). 
 37. Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658–68 (2013) 
(discussing four conceptions of insurance and stating that one of them, the contract conception, “is the 
most accurate description of what insurance is”); Craig Brown, “Accidental Loss” and Liability 
Insurance, 5 OTAGO L. REV. 523, 524 (1984) (“rules about liability insurance, in particular those 
pertaining to the question of fortuity, should be regarded as part of tort law at least as much as they 
should be considered part of commercial law . . . rules of fortuity constitute part of what we call the 
‘system’ of compensation . . .”); Fischer, supra  note 18, at 97 (“Compensation of the insured or the 
victim of the insured’s misconduct is now frequently intoned as a basic policy of insurance law. . .”); 
APPLEMAN ARCHIVE, supra note 25, at § 23.4, at 28 (making this point and citing cases). 
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elements: first, a conduct element, which captures the idea of the happening 
(or nonhappening) of an event that is contingent or a matter of chance 
because it is outside of the effective control of the parties to the contract 
and, more particularly, outside the effective control of the insured; and 
second, a cognitive element, which reflects the parties’ symmetric beliefs 
or information as to the happening, nonhappening, the manner of 
happening, the timing, or the extent of the relevant coverage-activating 
event.38  New York’s insurance statute, for example, captures both the 
conduct and cognitive elements of fortuity: “fortuitous event” is defined as 
“any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to 
be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of either party.”39  The classic 
definition of a “fortuitous event” found in the Restatement of Contracts 
also reflects these two components: 
 
A fortuitous event . . . is an event which so far as the 
parties to the contract are aware, is dependent on chance.  
It may be beyond the power of any human being to bring 
the event to pass; it may be within the control of third 
persons; it may even be a past event, such as the loss of a 
vessel, provided that the fact is unknown to the parties.40 
 
This definition occurs as part of the explication of the idea of an aleatory 
promise, that is, a “promise conditional on the happening of a fortuitous 
event, or an event supposed by the parties to be fortuitous.”41  An insurance 
policy is an example of an aleatory contract.42 
Importantly, the presence or absence of fortuity is to be determined 
relative to the effective control (over actions or injurious effects) and 
beliefs of the parties to the insurance contract.  There is no meaningful 
sense of fortuity, for purposes of liability-insurance-as-a-contractual-
relation, independent of the perspective of one or both of the contracting 
parties.43 
 
 38. Knutsen, supra note 8, at 77, 106 (insurable uncertainties belong to one of three categories: 
 factual, temporal, or extent); George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 
1009, 1020 (1989) (insurance can operate only if losses are probabilistic as to either whether they occur 
or when they occur); Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in Property and Liability Insurance, 36 
TORT & INS. L.J. 777, 801 (2001) (uncertainty as to timing of insured event). 
 39. MCKINNEY’S INS. LAW § 1101(a)(2) (2014).  See CAL. INS. CODE § 250 (2016) (“any 
contingent or unknown event, whether past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable 
interest, or create a liability against him, may be insured against . . . .”). 
 40. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. A (1932) [hereinafter, RESTATEMENT ]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “aleatory contract”). 
 43. Keeton & Widiss, supra note 9, at § 5.3(a), at 475 (“Fortuity is generally, though not 
invariably, considered from the point of view of the person (usually the insured) whose interest is the 
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The fortuity requirement in liability policies is implicated both by the 
process of contract formation and by post-formation performance.  Pre-
contract-formation, the fortuity requirement operates to prevent the 
prospective insured from transferring to the insurer the financial 
responsibility for a loss that the prospective insured knows to be occurring 
or to have already occurred, but which the insurer does not know to be 
occurring or to have occurred.  Insurer defenses to coverage such as the so-
called “known loss,” “known risk,” and “loss-in-progress” defenses, and 
fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation each appeal in some fashion 
to the idea of fortuity precontract formation.  They are grounded in either 
the notion that fortuity means the risk or contingency of a loss occurring 
(and not its certainty) before the transfer of that risk from the insured to the 
insurer, or, with respect to the insuring of some feature or features of a loss 
that has or may have occurred, symmetrical information as to that loss 
between the parties prior to contracting.44  Professor Abraham persuasively 
argues that “certainty of occurrence does not violate the fortuity 
requirement, only certainty of occurrence when it is linked with conscious 
awareness of that certainty.”45  The “conscious awareness” with which he is 
especially concerned is preformation asymmetric information that allows 
the insured to exploit his superior knowledge relative to the insurer to 
transfer a risk of loss or actual loss to the insurer that it would not have 
accepted, or would not have accepted on the terms that it did, if it had the 
same information as the insured.46 
Whereas asymmetric information and the resulting risk of 
misrepresentations to the carrier dominate pre-formation fortuity issues, 
both asymmetric control of conduct leading to losses and the cognitive 
element of fortuity are involved in post-formation fortuity issues that are 
associated with the term “accident” in CGL and other occurrence- and 
 
basis of an insurance claim.”); see id. at § 5.4(c), at 510–12; Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Ferraiolo Const. Co., 
584 A.2d 608, 610–11 (Me. 1990) (quoting Gray v. State Dep’t of Highways, 191 So. 2d 802, 816 (La. 
1966)) (whether an act is an ‘accident’ is to be ascertained from the intention of the parties to the 
contract). 
 44. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 38, at 790–96; D. S. Donaldson, J. D. James, The “Known 
Loss” Doctrine — Whose Knowledge and of What?, 8 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 43 (Spring 1996); R. L. 
Fruehauf, Note, The Cost of Knowledge:  Making Sense of “Nonfortuity” Defenses in Environmental 
Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes, 84 VA. L. REV. 107 (1988); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1992) (known loss doctrine grounded in fortuity 
requirement).  Freuhauf argues that the fortuity requirement in an insurance contract is wholly a matter 
of placing limits “on the severity of the information asymmetry that the law will tolerate” between the 
parties “at the inception of the insurance contract.”  Freuhauf, at 114; see id. at 112.  If this were 
correct, then the fortuity requirement would have no role in post-formation contract performance.  As 
will be clear from later Sections of this article, this is not the law and not how liability policies are 
written. 
 45. Abraham, supra note 38, at 792. 
 46. Id. at 794.  See also, Freuhauf, supra note 44, at 111–12. 
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accident-based liability policies.47  The cognitive element of fortuity comes 
into play there as part and parcel of the issue whether the actor had correct 
beliefs about the material circumstances or consequences of her action such 
that she could be said to have exercised effective control over her conduct 
and thus her action (or its injurious effects) happened as she intended.  This 
is reflected in statements such as, “[i]f a single insured is allowed through 
intentional acts to conspicuously control risks covered by the policy, the 
central concept of insurance [i.e., fortuity] is violated.”48  Similarly, 
Professor Stempel writes, “[w]here the ‘loss’ occurs at the direction of [i.e., 
intentionally and as effectively controlled by] the policyholder rather than 
due to a claim . . . by a third party, the loss is not fortuitous and should be 
excluded from coverage”49 and “losses intended or surely expected by the 
policyholder are not the result of chance.”50  In short, “[b]ecause insurance 
relies on fortuity, it unravels when the insured has complete control over 
whether a risk will materialize.”51 
We can restate the post-formation fortuity requirement in more 
general contract law terms.  The basis of the liability insurance bargain is 
that the insured agrees (a) to transfer to the insurer the duty to pay for his 
(actual or alleged) liabilities arising in connection with (actual or alleged) 
injuries to the interests of a third party and (b) not to intentionally cause 
such injuries through an action over which he exercises such effective 
control that the injuries are not, from his and the insurer’s perspective, a 
matter of practical contingency, uncertainty, or chance.  Briefly, the insured 
 
 47. Post-contract formation, the fortuity requirement also finds expression in other liability policy 
provisions, such as the insuring agreement’s extension of coverage for liability (and not for the third-
party injury or damage on which such liability is predicated, because litigation is always uncertain), the 
trigger-of-coverage requirement that the injury or damage occur during the policy period, and in 
business risk and criminal conduct exclusions.  See, e.g., M. W. Holley, The “Fortuity Doctrine”: 
Misapplying the Known Loss Rule to Liability Insurance Policies, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 529, 531 
(2009); Abraham, supra note 38, at 788–90, 793–94; KNUTSEN, supra, note 8, at 75–78, 95–111.  Only 
some of these issues directly implicate the actor’s control over his actions. 
 48. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citing 7A 
APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE  § 4492.01(Berdal ed.)). 
 49. Stempel, supra note 24, at § 1.05[a], at 1-33. 
 50. Id. 
51.  Knutsen, supra note 8, at 77.   
We see this as well in the expected or intended exclusion, which predominates in case law adopting 
the perspective of the Injurious Effects Only school.  This exclusion focuses on the insured’s state of 
mind  the cognitive element of fortuity  but her state of mind of itself is of no interest from a 
coverage perspective unless it is conjoined with her effective control over her actions to bring about 
effects injurious to the interests of a third party.  There is no coverage for losses that the insured 
expected or intended because the fact that the losses did occur as the insured intended or expected 
typically implies the insured’s control over her action and its effects to a degree that is inconsistent with 
the insurer’s intention that such injuries, or extent of the injurious effects, be outside the effective 
control of the insured.  See e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 1991) 
(quoting City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
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agrees not to act with the intent to make, and with such effective control 
that he does make, the contingent event that activates the insurer’s duties 
happen with certainty or a high degree of certainty.52 
The upshot of this analysis is that the fortuity requirement is 
inconsistent with or contrary to the concept of intentional action if and only 
if, in any particular intentional action, the actor exercises such effective 
control over his action that it conforms to his intent to bring about the 
(otherwise) contingent event that activates the insurer’s duties under the 
policy.  The question, then, is whether proponents of the Maxim can 
articulate and justify a theory of intentional action that satisfies this 
condition for all or the great majority of those actions that are the subject of 
liability insurance coverage disputes regarding the term “accident.”  They 
have yet to do so and, I argue in the remaining Sections of this article, they 
cannot do so. 
 
B. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF INTENTIONAL ACTION 
 
The certitude with which adherents to the Maxim profess the rule is 
curious given that the concept of intentional action is one of the most well-
contested battlegrounds in the law generally and one of the least analyzed 
concepts in insurance law.  Rather than analysis, one commonly finds 
instead broad declarations such as “an act is intentional if the actor desires 
to cause the consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are 
substantially certain to result from it.”53  Such pronouncements raise more 
questions than they answer.  For example: Is intentionality really a matter 
of either desire or beliefs, and not both?  What is the relation between an 
actor’s intent as to his act and as to its consequences?  Why doesn’t 
intentionality refer to “the act itself” and not to its consequences, as courts 
adopting the Causative Acts position have declared?54  When we talk about 
 
 52. The concepts of fortuity and moral hazard are closely related but distinct.  See e.g., Knutsen, 
supra note 8, at 77–78, 87; Abraham, supra note 38, at 789, 791–92.  One way to view this relation is 
that an insured-actor violates the fortuity requirement when he acts with the intent to cause the 
happening of the otherwise contingent event that activates the insurer’s duties, and his action realizes 
moral hazard when he violates the fortuity requirement with the further intent or knowledge that the 
insurer will bear the costs of his action. 
 53. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Omni Bank, 812 So. 2d 196, 201 (Miss. 2002) (internal quotations 
omitted); Jackson Cnty. Hosp. v. Ala. Hosp. Ass’n Trust, 652 So. 2d 233, 235 (Ala. 1994); APPLEMAN 
ARCHIVE, supra note 25, at § 117.4, at 28 (referring to intent in exclusionary clauses).  The quoted 
language is taken almost verbatim from section 8A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Champions 
of the Maxim have yet to explain why this tort concept of intent, which refers “to the consequences of 
an act rather than the act itself,” is applicable to the interpretation of a liability insurance contract. 
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A, cmt. a (1965). 
 54. See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); 
Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (Bourguignon), 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 537–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); 
Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 403–04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
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an intentional act, are we referring only to the actor’s bodily movement 
plus an internal state of mind, or are the circumstances and its 
consequences also part of the act?55  Of the infinite number of possible 
descriptions of an act,56 which are relevant to an insurance coverage 
determination and by what rule or criterion?  In the following discussion I 
shall offer an analysis of intentional action that begins, in a rudimentary 
way, to address these sorts of questions and to show why they are 
significant for the resolution of insurance coverage disputes. 
 
1. The Maxim: The Either-Or View of Intentional Action 
 
The Maxim expresses the view that the intentionality of an act is an 
either-or-but-not-both proposition  an act either has the property of being 
intentional or the property of being accidental (unintentional), and it cannot 
be both at the same time.  This either-or view of intentional action is both 
conceptually and empirically unsound. 
The first obstacle that any defense of the either-or view faces is 
entirely conceptual  that is, making sense of the concept of an accidental 
action, where such an action is entirely without any intention and distinct 
from a mere bodily movement (e.g., a nonintentional or wholly involuntary 
reflex jerk, twitch, and the like).57  If an “accidental action” refers only to 
mere bodily movements, then the Maxim effectively limits coverage under 
occurrence- and accident-based insuring agreements only to that narrow 
class of events.  That, of course, is absurd, and the case law adopting the 
Maxim is devoid of any suggestion that such a drastic limitation on 
coverage is intended.  We are left, then, with a concept of “accidental 
action” that refers to more than a mere bodily movement and yet also refers 
to wholly unintentional actions.  I submit that this is self-contradictory.  
There can be no such creature and, in any event, no champion of the 
Maxim has yet spotted one.  I discuss this point further in Section III.B.2 
below. 
A second obstacle that any such defense would have to surmount is 
that this view is contrary to common experience and, hence, is empirically 
unsound.  Insurance coverage case law is full of examples in which one and 
the same act is intentional but not fully intentional and, hence, in some 
respect fortuitous or accidental.  Champions of the Maxim reject this view 
because they erroneously adopt what I refer to as the Complete Control 
assumption.  This assumption and its implications merit extended 
 
 55. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra notes 67 and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
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discussion. 
 
a. The Complete Control Assumption 
 
This either-or view of intentional action finds its fuller and practical 
(action-focused) expression in the view that in acting intentionally an actor 
always exercises such complete control over his action that it completely 
conforms to his intention and it would be inconsistent also to view the act 
as fortuitous (the “Complete Control” assumption).  The Complete Control 
assumption attempts to express the idea of certainty in the realm of action 
or practice (as opposed to mathematical certainty (2 + 2 = 4) or theoretical 
certainty (the speed of light, for example)).  The idea is that an actor who 
has complete control over her action does that act or causes some effects 
with certainty, that is, leaving nothing to fortuity or accident.  We see the 
Complete Control assumption, for example, in the leading California case 
adopting the Maxim, Merced Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mendez,58 where the 
insured’s acts of sexual assault were deemed intentional and, hence, not an 
accident because “[a]ll of the acts, the manner in which they were done, 
and the objective accomplished transpired exactly as [the insured] intended.  
No additional, unexpected, independent, or unforeseen act occurred.”59  In a 
similar formulation, the Mississippi Supreme Court instructs us that in 
determining whether the insured’s act was an accident, “[t]he only relevant 
consideration is whether . . . the chain of events leading to the injuries 
complained of was set in motion and followed by a course consciously 
devised and controlled by [the insured] without the unexpected intervention 
of any third person or extrinsic force.”60  The differences between these 
formulations are not material for present purposes. 
 
 58. Merced Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  
 59. Id. at 280; accord Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal., 97 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 298, 304 (Cal. 2009) (citing numerous cases, including Mendez); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Frake, 
128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 310, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  
 60. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. OmniBank, 812 So. 2d 196, 200 (Miss. 2002); accord Red Ball 
Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 1990) (Indiana law).  A third 
variation focuses on the injuries as the “natural result” of the intentional act.  See, e.g., Thomas v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 247 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1957) (“[w]here acts are voluntary and intentional and the 
injury is the natural result of the act, the result was not caused by accident even though that result may 
have been unexpected, unforeseen and unintended.”). Some version of the Complete Control 
assumption also is found in related caselaw.  In a first-party property coverage dispute under Ohio law, 
a federal appellate court has contrasted the insured’s control over the loss with fortuity:  “Were we to 
ignore plaintiff’s control over its loss [through its intentional destruction of property] in deciding the 
fortuitousness of plaintiff’s claim, we would convert plaintiff’s all-risk insurance policy into a cash fund 
for plaintiff’s business plans.”  Univ. of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1282 (6th 
Cir. 1995).  See also J. W. Stempel, A Mixed Bag for Chicken Little: Analyzing Year 2000 Claims and 
Insurance Coverage, 48 EMORY L.J. 169, 219–20 (1999) (contrasting fortuitous losses with those 
within the control of the insured); Knutsen, supra note 8, at 77. 
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As the quoted language makes clear, the Complete Control 
assumption is inextricably intertwined with a theory of direct causation, 
that is, that the actor’s actions are the direct cause of the harms to the third 
party.  The actor’s complete control implies the absence of any unexpected 
or unintended concurrent or intervening cause that, in addition to the 
intentional act, produces the injurious effects.  In the Mississippi version, 
such an additional cause is referred to in the final clause quoted 
immediately above as, “the unexpected intervention of any third person or 
extrinsic force.”  In California and Washington case law, the presence of an 
uncontrolled (i.e., fortuitous) intervening or concurrent cause creates an 
exception to the Maxim that allows an intentional act to be described as an 
accident (the Causation Exception): “[a]n accident, however, is never 
present when the insured performs a deliberate act unless some additional, 
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs that produces 
the damage . . . .”61  I analyze this theory of direct causation and its limits in 
Section IV.B below. 
The problem with the Complete Control assumption is not that it is 
never true.  Undoubtedly there are many actions that conform to the actor’s 
intention because the actor has complete (or at least effective) control over 
his actions.  These types of actions may indeed be the norm.  That much 
allowed, the assumption is often, and perhaps usually, false in those factual 
scenarios that generate liability insurance coverage disputes in which the 
fortuity of the insured’s act or its effects is at issue.  Life is full of examples 
of intentional acts in which there is a lack of complete control (and, hence, 
there is fortuity) as to the fact of an act’s happening, the manner of its 
happening, the timing of its happening, or its effects or their extent.62  I 
 
 61. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (internal quotations and citations omitted); accord State Farm 
Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ; Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 26 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Mendez); Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 
123, 127 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). 
The Causation Exception is premised on a lack of fortuity in the causative act and attempts to 
remedy this by introducing fortuity through an “extrinsic,” “additional,” or “independent” event in the 
causal chain.  That strategy implicitly is a repudiation of the fundamental premise of the Causative Acts 
school, namely, that there must be fortuity in the act that initiates the causal sequence.  No court that 
has adopted the Maxim has explained this inconsistency.  Moreover, if an intervening or concurrent 
cause is found, then, the argument goes, that event would permit or require the intentional act to be 
described as an accident.  But it is entirely unclear why, since the act is still intentional and in many 
cases the insured exercises no less control over it just because a concurrent or later independent event 
intervenes.  The insured does lose control over the effects of the act, but if loss of control as to effects is 
determinative, then “accident” should refer to the actor’s intent as to the effects of his action and not 
“the [causative] act itself.”  
62.  See MCKINNEY’S INS. LAW, supra note 39.  For example, see the cases discussed infra 
Sections IV and V.  
Professor Abraham makes a similar connection between absent belief (lack of knowledge) and 
fortuity in the context of first-party insurance.  Abraham, supra note 38, at 792.  
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may be intentionally driving my car, but not intentionally driving twenty 
miles per hour over the speed limit, even though I am doing that in the very 
same act.  A manufacturer may intentionally use materials other than those 
specified, but not intentionally make the product less safe, even though he 
is doing both in the same act.  The lack of complete control often is 
especially apparent when the insured’s actual or alleged liability arises not 
out of her own acts but rather out of the acts of a third party for which the 
insured is liable, as in cases of vicarious liability.63  The Maxim 
erroneously expands one model of intentional action  that in which the 
Complete Control assumption holds true  to encompass all types of 
intentional action, as if it is the only model of intentional action. 
One plausible explanation for the ready and unquestioning judicial 
adoption of the Complete Control assumption and theory of direct 
causation is the implicit acceptance of a sharp line between an action, on 
the one hand, and its circumstances and consequences, on the other.  On 
this view, intent consists entirely of a desire to do an action and the 
“action” is conceived narrowly only as a bodily movement or narrow set of 
movements of some sort. 
Whatever its facial plausibility may be, this argument does not 
withstand analysis.  Consider initially the sharp distinction between an 
action and its circumstances.  It is not unheard of in the law to define an 
action as consisting only of one’s bodily movement and the corresponding 
intention.  We see this, for example, in the leading hornbook on tort law: 
An act is “a voluntary contraction of the muscles, and nothing more.”64  Yet 
this narrow conception of an action hardly bears the imprimatur of 
necessity.  Consider a relatively simple act of sawing a piece of wood.  
 
63.  See, e.g., Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1921) (liability for acts of juvenile 
driver); Crook v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 428 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (homeowner’s 
liability for intentional suicide of guest); IFCO Sys. N. Am., Inc. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., No. 11-
2328, 2013 WL 29120 (4th Cir. Jan. 3, 2013) (employer’s liability for theft by employees from a third 
party). 
The injuries to a third party that give rise to questions of liability coverage are not necessarily 
causally related to the insured’s actions or to the consequences of the insured’s actions.  WINDT, supra 
note 17, at § 11.3 at 1185 (“occurrence” encompasses both actions by the insured and “any event that 
causes injury/damage during the policy period.”); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 411 N.E. 2d 1157, 
1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (occurrence definition “eliminates the need for an exact finding as to the cause 
of damages so long as they are neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured”); 
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 15 P.3d 115, 129 (Wash. 2000), as amended (Jan. 16, 2001); 
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 306–07 (Colo. 2003); Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E. 2d 1279, 1284 (Ind. 2006).  “Accident” refers to any actions or events that 
cause injurious effects for which the insured is allegedly or actually liable.  It does not necessarily refer 
to the insured’s acts. 
 64. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 34 (5th ed., 
1984); accord J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M. K., 804 P.2d 689, 694 n.11 (Cal. 1991) (quoting and 
adopting this language from Prosser and Keeton).  
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That act may be described as “moving my arm back and forth while 
holding a saw,” “sawing a plank,” “sawing oak,” “sawing one of Smith’s 
planks,” “destroying Smith’s property,” “making a great deal of sawdust,” 
and so on.65  By what principle or rule is only the narrowest of these 
descriptions (that is, the first one) the “right,” “correct,” or necessary one?  
Again, consider the act of flipping a light switch, which may be described 
as: “moving my finger in an upward movement,” “flipping the switch,” 
“turning on the light,” “signaling a co-conspirator to begin an act of arson,” 
or “alerting a prowler to the fact that I am here.”66  What gives only the first 
of these descriptions pride of place in coverage analyses?  Why does only 
the first of these descriptions truly describe the “act”?  An act can have 
innumerable true descriptions,67 no one or group of which is necessarily 
authoritative.  Accordingly, an act can be viewed very narrowly in terms 
only of intentional bodily movements or more broadly as also including its 
circumstances and/or consequences. 
This insight is hardly novel, and particularly not novel in the law.  
More than 100 years ago, Salmond wrote in his classic Jurisprudence: 
 
An act has no natural boundaries, any more than an event 
or a place has.  Its limits must be artificially defined for the 
purpose in hand for the time being.  It is for the law to 
determine, in each particular case, what circumstances and 
what consequences shall be counted within the compass of 
the act with which it is concerned.  To ask what act a man 
has done is like asking in what place he lives.68 
 
If proponents of the Maxim are committed to a very narrow conception of 
“the act itself” as a bodily movement plus intent and a sharp demarcation 
between an act, so conceived, and its circumstances and consequences, they 
need to defend that view, recognizing that they are rowing against a strong 
and long jurisprudential current, and to show how it is required by liability 
policy language or other applicable insurance requirements, such as the 
 
 65. The example is adapted from G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 11 (1976) [hereinafter, 
ANSCOMBE]. 
 66. The example is adapted from DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 4.  
 67. See, e.g., ANSCOMBE, supra note 65, at 11–12; DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 4–5, 58–59; A. R. 
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 8 (A. R. White ed., 1968).  Importantly, as we will see in Section 
IV, the actor may intend his action only under some of these descriptions and may be mistaken as to 
other descriptions, e.g., I intend to “saw one of Smith’s planks” (when in fact I am mistakenly sawing a 
plank that belongs to me).  
 68.   Salmond, supra note 24, at § 129, at 403–04; see also id. at 403 (“We habitually and rightly 
include all material and relevant circumstances and consequences under the name of the act.”); WHITE, 
supra note 67, at 11 (“There is . . . no incompatibility in describing something at one time as the 
consequences of an act, but at another time as part of the act.”).  
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fortuity requirement. 
 
2. Act Pluralism 
 
The alternative to the either-or theory of action embodied in the 
Maxim is a pluralistic theory of action that is far more empirically sound 
and reflects more accurately the nature of coverage disputes surrounding 
the meaning and application of “accident.”  The pluralistic theory of action 
that I present here has roots reaching back to Aristotle, and has been 
adopted, more or less expressly, by many modern philosophers of action, 
jurists, and legal scholars. 
On this pluralistic view, all actions by definition are intentional.69  To 
say that an action is intentional generally means that the actor (1) has 
effective control over his bodily movements (an action is distinct from a 
mere bodily (wholly unintentional) movement such as a reflex motion, a 
jerk, or a fall down a flight of stairs),70 (2) acts for a freely chosen and 
desired purpose (and not under duress, compulsion, or the like), (3) has 
correct beliefs about all or most of the material circumstances of his 
action.71  Actions are less than fully intentional (or less than fully voluntary, 
to use a more traditional term) when one or more of these elements is 
missing entirely or to some degree.  Thus in the case of my intentionally 
driving but unknowingly driving in excess of the speed limit, we might say 
that my doing that act was less than fully intentional and, to that extent, my 
act was an accident.  Aristotle calls these sorts of actions “mixed,” because 
 
 69. See, e.g., ANSCOMBE, supra note 65, at 12–13; DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 43–45; GEWIRTH, 
supra note 28, at 27, 31–42, 219; Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921) (“Every 
act, if we exclude, as we must, gestures or movements that are automatic or instinctive, is willful 
[intentional] when viewed in isolation and irrespective of its consequences.  An act ex vi termini 
imports the exercise of volition.”); HOLMES’ APPLEMAN, supra note 5, at 512 (“It is not a sufficient line 
of demarcation to speak of an act as being ‘intentional.’  Almost every conscious, or voluntary, act must 
fall in this category.”); Knutsen, supra note 8, at 87 (“every action requires some level of intent”); 
WINDT, supra note 17, at § 11.3, at 11-56 nn. 29 (“almost all human acts at some level, are 
intentional”). 
 70. Some philosophers use the term “involuntary actions” to refer to what I have described as mere 
bodily movements.  See, e.g., ANSCOMBE, supra note 65, at 13–14.  The difference is merely semantic 
and not substantive.  If that alternative usage is favored, our discussion would proceed with the 
understanding that by “action” I mean only “intentional action” or “voluntary action,” since mere bodily 
movements or “involuntary actions” seldom implicate insurance law.  
71.  See, e.g., GEWIRTH, supra note 28, at 27, 31–42, 219; ANSCOMBE, supra note 65, at 13–14; see 
generally DAVIDSON, supra note 28.  On the distinction between mere bodily movements and actions 
specifically, see also Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co. 179 P.3d 421, 425 (Kan. 2008) (“‘In a certain 
sense, all acts are intentional, save perhaps for involuntary muscle spasms.’”) (quoting M. W. Dykes, 
Occurrences, Accidents, and Expectations:  A Primer of These (and Some Other) Insurance-Law 
Concepts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 831, 846–47 (2003)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965) 
(stating “[t]here cannot be an act without volition” and distinguishing an act from “a knee jerk” and 
other similar nonintentional behaviors).  
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they have elements of the intentional and the unintended.72  He specifically 
identifies actions brought about by force and ignorance of the particular 
circumstances of one’s action as “involuntary” or less than fully 
intentional.73  When we consider intentional action from this perspective of 
fully voluntary actions and “mixed” actions, an action can have multiple 
properties that, in many cases, permit us to truly describe the action as both 
intentional and accidental.  I shall refer to this as the principle of Act 
Pluralism. 
Act Pluralism has resonated with Anglo-American legal scholars for 
decades.  More than a century ago Salmond wrote: 
 
An act may be wholly unintentional, or wholly 
intentional, or intentional in part only.  It is wholly 
unintentional if no part of it is the outcome of any 
conscious purpose or design, no part of it having existed in 
idea before it became realised in fact.  I may omit to pay a 
debt, because I have completely forgotten that it exists . . . .  
An act is wholly intentional, on the other hand, when every 
part of it corresponds to the precedent idea of it, which was 
present in the actor’s mind, and of which it is the outcome 
and realisation.  The issue falls completely within the 
boundaries of the intent.  Finally, an act may be in part 
intentional and in part unintentional.  The idea and the fact, 
the will and the deed, the design and the issue, may be only 
partially coincident.  If I throw stones, I may intend to 
break a window but not to do personal harm to any one; 
yet in the result I may do both of these things.74 
 
 
 
 72. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. 1, 1110a1–15 (Terrence Irwin trans., 1985). 
73.  Id. at bk. III, chap. 1, 1110a1–1111a24; accord H. L. A. HART & A. M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION 
IN THE LAW 38–39, 130–34 (1978)); Salmond, supra note 24, at § 134, 414 (“A wrong [in tort] is 
[wholly] intentional only when the intention extends to all of the elements of the wrong, and therefore 
to its circumstances no less than to its origins and consequences.”). 
Aristotle regarded actions done under duress or forced choice (e.g., the robber’s command, “your 
money or your life,” or jettisoning supplies from a ship in a storm) as one form of “mixed” actions, 
containing aspects of the fully voluntary and the “involuntary” (that is, less than fully voluntary). 
 ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, at bk. III, chap. 1, 1109b35–1110a19.  I shall not discuss further how 
duress, forced choice, and other forms of compulsion bear on my critique of the Maxim, other than to 
note that the analysis of these types of less than fully voluntary acts in the context of the occurrence- 
and accident-based insuring agreements would show that Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. 
Club of S. Cal., 211 P.3d 1083 (Cal. 2009), was wrongly decided.  The argument for this claim must be 
left for a later article. 
 74. Salmond, supra note 24, at § 134 at 41314. 
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H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré similarly note that in both common speech 
and legal usage: 
 
. . . a human action is said not to be voluntary or not fully 
voluntary if some one or more of a quite varied range of 
circumstances are present: if it is done ‘unintentionally’ 
(i.e. by mistake or by accident); or ‘involuntarily’ (i.e. 
where normal muscular control is absent); ‘unconsciously’, 
or under various types of pressure exerted by other human 
beings (coercion or duress); or even under the pressure of 
legal or moral obligation, or as a choice of the lesser of two 
evils, which is often expressed by saying that the agent 
‘had no choice’ or ‘no real choice’.75 
 
Hart and Honoré provide a long list of circumstances that may render an 
action less than fully voluntary, including physical compulsion, motives of 
self-preservation, safeguarding of rights, privileges, or interests of self or 
others, and mistake or ignorance of some relevant circumstance of one’s 
action.76  This notion of less than fully voluntary action is sometimes 
expressed by the adage that “what is voluntary conduct is a matter of 
degree.”77 
Courts adopting the Maxim commonly tell us that an accident is an 
“unintended act” or “an act which the insured does not intend to perform,” 
where such phrases are meant to exclude all intent from an act.78  On the 
 
 75. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 73, at 38. 
 76. Id. at 134–44. 
77.  Id. at 133.  Accord, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Action and Responsibility, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION at 117–18 (A. R. White ed., 1968) (“Voluntariness . . . is a matter of degree.”); Stuart v. 
Weisflog’s Showroom Gallery, Inc., 753 N.W. 2d 448, 458 (Wis. 2008) (an act of misrepresentation 
“requires a degree of volition inconsistent with the term accident.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
The notion that intent can be a matter of degree, and is not always an all-or-nothing proposition, is 
not foreign to insurance coverage law.  It is common for courts to hold that while losses that are 
subjectively expected or intended are excluded from coverage, acts with a lesser degree of intentionality 
with respect to the injurious effects, specifically recklessness, gross negligence, and negligence, are not 
excluded.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co., 179 P.3d 421, 431–32 (Kan. 2008); United Serv. 
Auto Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982 (Pa. Super. 1986); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steinemer, 723 F.2d 873 
(11th Cir. 1984).  If an actor can have varying degrees of intent with respect to the injurious effects of 
which a third party complains, there would appear to be no reason why the actor cannot similarly have 
varying degrees of intent with respect to his own actions.  At least there is no principle of insurance law 
that would prohibit such a conceptualization of an insured actor’s actions for purposes of resolving 
coverage disputes. 
78.  See, e.g., Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 
(“accident” refers to “an unintended act” and “an act which the insured does not intend to perform”); 
ACS Sys., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“An 
‘accident’ requires unintentional acts or conduct”); Ray v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 
477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2003) 
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pluralistic theory of action I have presented, such phrases are oxymorons or 
otherwise meaningless.  If champions of the Maxim claim that they are not 
 as they must  then it is incumbent upon them to declare what they 
mean by these phrases and to argue for the theory of action that justifies 
them, all without conceding the principle of Act Pluralism.79  How can an 
act be (a) wholly unintended or nonintentional, (b) something other or more 
than a mere bodily movement, and (c) not an instance of less than fully 
voluntary action (partially intentional and partially accidental or 
nonintentional) all at the same time?  I submit that it cannot be, and yet that 
is exactly the position to which proponents of the Maxim are committed. 
Advocates of and courts who adopt the Maxim view human conduct 
as falling into three categories: (a) mere bodily movements, (b) intentional 
actions in which the actor exercises complete control over his action such 
that it completely conforms to his intention, and (c) a mysterious, 
unexplained category of “accidental actions” or “unintentional actions.”  
The alternative pluralistic view of action also views human conduct as 
consisting of categories (a) and (b), and has the added virtue of being able 
to offer an explanation for category (c).  Act Pluralism holds that 
“accidental action” and “unintentional action” refer to an action that is both 
intentional in some respect and not intentional in some other respect, that 
is, an action that is “mixed” in being not fully intentional.  As I will discuss 
further in the following Section, these sorts of “mixed” actions are at the 
heart of many types of coverage disputes, and those disputes only can be 
analyzed and resolved properly from the perspective of a pluralistic theory 
of action. 
To summarize the critique thus far, the Maxim does not follow as a 
direct implication of the definition of “accident,” reflects an incoherent 
theory of intentional action, and is grounded in an assumption of the actor’s 
complete control over his actions that is an empirically unsound model for 
many, and maybe most, insurance coverage disputes.  These many flaws in 
the arguments for the Maxim ought, at the very least, to give champions of 
this rule serious reason to pause and reconsider its merits.  They are also, I 
submit, more than sufficient reason to abandon the Maxim as a general rule 
of decision altogether. 
 
 
 
(“accident” refers to “an unforeseen or unexpected act that was involuntary or unintentionally done” 
and to “accidental acts”).  See also Cap. City Ins. Co. v. Forks Timber Co., No. CV 511–039, 2012 WL 
3757555, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (“unintentional acts that cause unintended injuries constitute 
accidents”). 
 79.  To concede that principle is, of course, to reject the monistic “either-or” view of action that 
informs the Maxim. 
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IV. ACTIONS THAT MISFIRE 
 
When an actor’s action does not completely conform to his intention, 
when the actor performs an action but fails to do what he intends, we may 
say that his act “misfired.”  Actions that misfire are the contrary of those 
actions in which the actor exercises such control that they completely 
conform to his intention, that is, actions in which the Complete Control 
assumption is empirically grounded.  Actions that misfire are one common 
type of action at issue in many coverage disputes.  In this Section I discuss 
actions that misfire to further illustrate the fundamental problems with the 
Maxim (and its associated doctrines, the theory of intentional action, the 
Complete Control assumption, and the theory of direct causation), and the 
soundness of a pluralistic theory of action for the resolution of many 
coverage disputes.  Thereafter, in Section V, I use misfires to show the 
consistency between the pluralistic theory of action I have presented and 
the fortuity requirement, which is also to demonstrate that the Maxim is not 
a necessary implication of the fortuity requirement. 
 
A. MISTAKEN BELIEF AND IMPROPER EXECUTION 
 
One way an action can misfire is that the actor acts on a mistaken 
belief (or beliefs) as to one (or more) material circumstances of his action.  
Aristotle held that one class of “involuntary” actions (that is, less than fully 
voluntary actions) is that in which the actor is ignorant of the circumstances 
of the action or the objects with which it is concerned.  “A man may be 
ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting 
on, and sometimes also what (e.g., what instrument) he is doing it with, and 
to what end . . . and how he is doing it . . .”80  More recently, Hart and 
Honoré identify mistake as one of the several circumstances of an action 
that renders it less than fully voluntary.81  To revert to an earlier example, 
Mary was mistaken in her belief that the 61C bus would take her home, and 
so she boarded a bus that did not take her home.  Or, to take a standard 
example of driving an automobile from a classic coverage opinion by 
Justice Cardozo: “A driver turns for a moment to the wrong side of the 
road, in the belief that the path is clear, and deviation safe.  The act of 
deviation is willful, but not the collision supervening.”82  In other words, 
the driver’s belief that the path was clear forms part of the driver’s intent to 
act, and that belief was mistaken.  The point to be drawn from these 
 
 80. ARISTOTLE, supra note 72, at bk. III, ch. 1, 110b5–1111a3-8.  
 81. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 73, at 38. 
 82. Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921).  See also Fischer, supra note 5, 
at 91. 
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examples is that when mistaken belief is a property of an intentional action 
the actor does not exercise complete control over his action and the action 
can be described as both intentional and as an accident. 83 
Closely related to misfires as a result of mistaken belief are misfires 
due to improper execution (or mistake in performance).  To revert to 
Justice Cardozo’s hypothetical, if asked, the insured driver would state that 
his intent was to drive safely, to arrive at his destination safely and without 
causing property damage to a third party, and the like.  He did not execute 
his intent properly, however.  His improper performance of his intended act 
thus could be described as accidental.  The improper execution misfire 
focuses on the end desired or wanted by the insured actor, here, his desire 
to arrive at his destination safely and without causing property damage to a 
third party.  This is distinct from, but closely related to, the mistaken belief 
misfire, which focuses on the beliefs of the insured actor and not his 
desired ends. 
Of course, as the example demonstrates, one might improperly 
perform an action because of a mistaken belief (“there is no oncoming 
traffic in the left lane”), but a mistaken belief is not a necessary condition 
of improper execution.  Suppose our driver knows that there is an 
oncoming car but routinely makes sharp turns in front of oncoming 
vehicles.  He improperly performs his firmly held intention of driving 
safely or arriving at his destination safely, and yet without a mistaken 
belief.  Whether improper execution is joined with mistaken belief or not, 
an intentional act that is improperly executed often also can be described as 
an accident even without reference to further effects of the act (e.g., 
whether the driver hit another car).84 
Courts that adopt the Maxim commonly reject misfire analysis.  
Specifically, they often state that a mistaken belief as to some 
circumstances of the act does not “transform,” “change,” or “alter” an 
intentional act into an accident, even where the mistake was not a mistake 
about the act’s injurious effects.  In reviewing wrongful termination 
coverage cases in California, the Court in Modern Development Co. v. 
Navigators Insurance Co.85 stated, “[a] mistake of fact in an employment 
 
 83. Closely related to mistaken belief is absence of belief.  An actor may not have a belief about 
circumstances relevant to her decision-making, as when, for example, a driver speeds down a dark road 
and does not know whether the road stays straight or curves sharply to the left or right.  I ignore this 
distinction for present purposes and treat mistaken belief as including absence of a relevant belief. 
84.  Consider another automobile hypothetical.  An insured is intentionally driving to work.  As he 
approaches an intersection, a clearly visible stop sign directs him to stop.  Yet he does not stop because 
he does not see the stop sign.  He clears the intersection without colliding with another vehicle.  When a 
policeman pulls him over and asks why he ran the stop sign, the insured driver may correctly say, “It 
was an accident, I didn’t see the sign,” or “I was distracted.” 
 85. Modern Development Co. v. Navigators Insurance Co., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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termination does not transform the intentional act of terminating an 
employee into an accident thereby triggering an insurer’s duty to defend.”86  
In a coverage action for rape and sexual assault, the Court rejected the 
argument that the insured’s mistaken belief as to the victim’s consent 
allowed his intentional acts to be described as accidents: “Yet even if a jury 
was to find that the insured was mistaken in his belief as to whether the 
claimant ‘consented’ to the touching, embracing . . . there was still no 
additional happening constituting an ‘accident’ which caused the injuries.  
The other party’s consent, or lack thereof, cannot change the [non-
accidental] nature of the insured’s deliberate acts.”87  In a case of felonious 
sexual assaults by the insured, the insured claimed that he honestly 
believed that the victim consented to his assaults, and thus that the assaults, 
although intentional, were an accident or negligent.  The Court rejected the 
argument that “this mistaken belief ‘alter[s] the very character of the act 
itself’ and renders it accidental.” 88 
The error in this view is not that mistaken belief does transform an 
intentional act into an accident.  Rather, the error is found one step earlier.  
The judicial framing of the issue as being whether an intentional act can be 
“transformed,” “changed,” or “altered” into an accident itself is misguided.  
It misconceives the problem as a sort of pragmatic “alchemy”; to wit, is 
mistaken belief a catalyst that when added to an intentional act eliminates 
the intent and transforms it into an accident?  When so 
(mis)conceptualized, it is an easy step for the courts to rule that this 
“alchemy” must fail.  Viewing the issue as one of the change or 
transformation of an intentional act into an accident is misplaced in the first 
instance because misfires due to mistaken belief are concurrently both 
 
2003). 
 86.  Id. at 535 (citing and quoting, inter alia, Lipson v. Jordache Enter., Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 
276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“An employment termination, even if due to a mistake, cannot be 
unintentional.”)). 
 87. Quan v. Truck Ins. Exch., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 143–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 88. Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 261 Cal. Rptr. 273, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  See also 
Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal., 211 P.3d 1083, 1091–92 (Cal. 2009) 
(rejecting insured’s argument that his unreasonable belief in need for self-defense converts an 
intentional act into an accident); Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exch., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 656–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (mistaken belief in victim’s consent did not make intentional sexual assault and false 
imprisonment an accident); Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir. 
2000) (Georgia law); Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Indiana law) (“A volitional act does not become an accident simply because the insured’s 
negligence [in having a mistaken belief] prompted the act.”); Cap. City Ins. Co. v. Forks Timber Co., 
No. CV 511-039, 2012 WL 3757555, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2012) (Georgia law) (the insured’s 
mistaken belief that there were no legal encumbrances on timber it intentionally cut and harvested did 
not allow the insured’s intentional act to be described as an accident); Macon Iron & Paper Stock Co. v. 
Transcontinental Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (the insured “may have been 
mistaken about its property rights, but that mistake . . . does not amount to an ‘accident’ . . . .”). 
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intentional and accidental acts.  We can begin to see this by considering 
actions that misfire because of improper execution. 
Consider a few examples of improper execution: misreading a sign, 
misinterpreting an order, underestimating a weight, and miscalculating a 
sum.
89 
 In each of these cases, the actor is doing something intentionally: A 
misreading is an intentional reading; misinterpreting an order is an 
interpretation of the order with the intention of interpreting it correctly, and 
so on.  In each case, however, the actor fails to do what he intends, and his 
action is, then, to some extent outside of his control and accidental (and, 
significantly, is accidental without the obvious or detectable intervention of 
an “extrinsic” or “independent” force as required by the Causation 
Exception).  The act is not “transformed” or “changed” from an intentional 
act into an accident.  Rather, the same act can be described as an intentional 
act, by reference to those properties that make it intentional, or as an 
accident, by reference to those properties that make it accidental. 
The same analysis applies in cases of misfires due to mistaken belief.  
If I intentionally spill a liquid from my mug believing it is tea when in fact 
it is coffee, then I intentionally spill the contents of my mug but at the same 
time accidentally spill the coffee.  I did not intend to spill the coffee, and so 
my action is not an intentional “spilling of the coffee,” even though it is an 
intentional “spilling of the liquid in my mug” (which I mistakenly believed 
was tea).  Significantly, I did not exercise such effective (let alone 
complete) control over my action that it completely conformed to my 
intention.  The act I intended  spilling the tea  did not happen at all, 
and thus did not happen as I intended.  The same action, then, is both an 
intentional act (under one description) and an accident (under another 
description), with talk of the “transformation” or “change” of one to 
another being superfluous at best and otherwise misguided. 
The judicial rejection of misfire analysis also is sometimes based on 
evidentiary considerations, namely, the court simply will not credit the 
insured’s claim that certain acts, particularly repugnant acts of sexual 
assault or child abuse, were done with a mistaken belief as to a material 
circumstance of the act, especially when the alleged mistaken belief is 
unreasonable.  But those cases present an issue of the existence, or not, of 
an evidentiary predicate for the application of a misfire analysis.  The 
existence or absence of evidence in a particular case is not an argument that 
an intentional act can never misfire such that it would never be proper to 
also describe it as an accident. 
Indeed, some courts that reject the misfire analysis on the facts of the 
 
 89. The examples are from DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 45.  My discussion of improper execution 
in this paragraph and the next borrows from Davidson’s Agency, at 45. 
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case before them concede, inconsistently, the possibility of misfire in 
principle.  The California Court of Appeal in Swain v. California Casualty 
Insurance Co.,90 a wrongful eviction coverage case, rejected the misfire 
analysis for cases of mistaken belief, but suggested that it was acceptable in 
cases of improper execution: “[W]e can imagine an arguably ‘accidental’ 
firing where, e.g., the employer intends to discharge John Doe but, through 
miscommunication, fires Don Joe instead.  Similarly, a landlord’s agent 
might ‘accidentally’ serve notice to quit on the wrong tenant.  Those facts 
are not before us . . .”91  The Court, however, failed to explain why an act 
can be described as both intentional and accidental in the case of improper 
execution misfires but not mistaken belief misfires.  It cannot be simply a 
matter of more credible evidence in one type of misfire (improper 
execution) than in the other (mistaken belief), since, again, that is simply a 
matter of the existence, or not, of the evidentiary predicate for applying a 
misfire analysis to particular facts.  Note, further, that in accepting the 
possibility of the application of a misfire analysis and the dual act 
descriptions in improper execution cases, the Swain Court has implicitly 
abandoned the Maxim. 
Similarly, in Lyons v. Fire Insurance Exchange,92 a coverage case 
involving alleged sexual overtures and false imprisonment, the Court 
rejected the misfire analysis as to the insured’s claim that he mistakenly 
believed that the victim consented and yet discussed two other hypothetical 
false imprisonment examples in which a mistaken belief would permit an 
intentional act to be described as accidental.  “In the first example, a 
shopkeeper at closing time intentionally locks his storage vault but forgets 
he had sent an employee inside to take inventory.  In the second example, a 
store employee honestly but mistakenly detains a customer the employee 
believes is a shoplifter.”93  The Court concluded from these examples, 
“even though conduct is intentional and results in the restraint and control 
of the movements of another person, false imprisonment can be in some 
circumstances accidental.”94  The Court made no attempt to reconcile this 
conclusion with the Maxim.  Rather, the Court attempted to distinguish its 
own two misfire hypotheticals from the mistaken belief case before it on 
the grounds that those examples involve “mistakes as to objective facts” 
whereas the insured here “asserts merely his mistaken subjective belief 
about another person’s consent.”95 
 
 90. Swain v. California Casualty Insurance Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 91. Id. at 813. 
 92. Lyons v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 93. Id. at 655 (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Lyons, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 656. 
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The distinction is spurious.  The mistaken beliefs of the insured in 
Lyon and of the store employee with respect to the hypothetical shoplifter 
are equally “subjective”; further, the victim’s consent, or lack of consent, to 
the imprisonment and restraint is equally an “objective fact” in the case that 
was before the Court and in its hypotheticals.  The Court offered no 
grounds for holding otherwise and, I submit, there are none.  A belief 
actually held by an actor cannot be anything other than “subjective” and, if 
one likes the language of “objective facts,” it is difficult to see how the fact 
of a person’s consent (or lack of consent) to being the recipient of an act of 
another could be any less “objective” than any other fact (the employee is 
in the storage vault) that may (or may not) exist.96 
Sometimes we flub an act  it misfires.  There is no good general 
argument for the rejection of the proposition that, when the appropriate 
evidentiary basis exists, an action may misfire and, when it does, the action 
is both intentional and accidental. 
 
B. MISFIRES AND DIRECT CAUSATION 
 
If the foregoing analysis of misfires is correct, then there is no need to 
embark on a quest for an “external” intervening or concurrent cause to 
“transform” or “alter” an intentional act into an accident.97  There are 
properties of the act itself  “internal” to the act, if one favors that 
language  that make both the description of the act as intentional and the 
description of the act as an accident true.  A mistaken belief is an ill-formed 
or incorrect part of the actor’s intention itself (“I believe the liquid in the 
mug is tea” when in fact it is coffee), and this “internal” property of my act 
permits it to be described as an accidental spilling of the coffee, even while 
it is also intentional spilling of the contents of the mug.  Mistaken belief as 
to material circumstances of an action can make that action an accident no 
less than an “external” intervening or concurrent cause.  My wife asks, 
“why did you spill out your coffee?” and I very naturally answer, “it was an 
 
 96. The judicial rejection of the view that a mistaken belief may “transform” an intentional act into 
an accident also may be informed, more or less implicitly, by the view that there is a sharp demarcation 
between an action as a bodily movement plus intent, on the one hand, and the circumstances or 
consequences of the act, on the other hand.  See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.  On this 
view, a mistaken belief as to the circumstances in which an action takes place or as to its consequences 
is a mistake with respect to something other than the action itself and, further, is distinct from the 
conative aspect that purportedly is the whole of intentionality (that is, the want or desire).  A mistaken 
belief, then, cannot alter the intentional nature of the bodily movement that is (deemed to be) the action 
and, hence, a mistaken belief cannot transform an intentional act into an accident.  I have discussed 
previously the difficulties with this view of intentional action.  See supra notes 64-68 and 
accompanying text, and Section III.B.2 generally. 
 97. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
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accident; I didn’t intend to; I thought it was tea.”  My colleague asks, “why 
did you add the column of numbers incorrectly?” and I answer, “it was an 
accident; I didn’t intend to; I made a mistake.”  The theory of action 
informing the Maxim and the corollary of direct causation cannot account 
for this very common use of “accident” and our common characterization 
of some of our acts as both intentional and accidental without the presence 
of any “external” cause. 
It is useful to consider one of the leading cases in which a court 
appeals to the theory of direct causation to bolster its analysis of a mistaken 
belief misfire, and to see why its use of the theory of direct causation is 
especially flawed.  In Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co.,98 the insured seller repossessed four trucks because its 
accounting system erroneously indicated that the buyer had defaulted on its 
payments.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected mistaken belief misfire analysis, stating “a volitional act that is 
based on erroneous information is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’”99  The 
Court attempted to justify this view by the Complete Control assumption 
and the theory of direct causation: 
 
The only relevant consideration is whether . . . the chain of 
events leading to the injuries complained of was set in 
motion and followed a course consciously devised and 
controlled by appellant without the unexpected 
intervention of any third person or extrinsic force.100 
 
This argument is doubly flawed. 
First, if the insured’s mistaken belief is credited as fact, as it was here, 
then the “course” of events that occurred  the conversion of the trucks  
was not “consciously devised and controlled” by the insured through his 
action(s).  The insured’s mistaken belief just means that he did not 
“consciously devise” “to convert the trucks.”  Rather, he “consciously 
devised” “to repossess the trucks consistent with his legal rights” (or to 
bring about some other similarly legitimate purpose), and that did not 
 
 98. 915 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1990) (Indiana law).  The Indiana Supreme Court later rejected Red Ball 
Leasing as a correct statement of Indiana Law.  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 1279, 
1285–86 (Ind. 2006).  Nonetheless, for the points discussed here, Red Ball Leasing did not rely on any 
Indiana law, but rather on cases from other jurisdictions.  Moreover, it is an oft relied on case (see, e.g., 
CRC Scrap Metal Recycling, LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 7:12–146–HMH, 2012 WL 4903661, 
at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2012)), and its reasoning is paradigmatic on misfires and direct causation, and so 
it merits analysis. 
 99. Red Ball Leasing, Inc., 915 F.2d at 310 (quoting Ed Winkler & Son, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 
441 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)). 
 100. Id. 
  
334 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
happen because of his mistaken belief.101  It is inconsistent for the Court to 
hold both that the insured acted with a mistaken belief as to the buyer’s 
default and that in acting under that mistaken belief the insured 
“consciously devised” the alleged conversion.  The insured did not do the 
act he intended and, therefore, the Complete Control assumption is not 
empirically grounded in this case. 
A champion of the Maxim may respond, citing to Red Ball and many 
other cases, that the inescapable fact is that the insured did exactly what he 
intended to do.  “Red Ball intended to repossess the trucks” and it did just 
that.102  In a coverage case in which insureds took more than 5,000 cubic 
yards of “borrow material” (dirt, rocks, and the like) from land under the 
mistaken belief that the seller had title to the material, the Court stated that 
in removing the material the insureds “did exactly what they intended to 
do.”103  Similarly, in a coverage action in which the insured cut up railcars 
for use as scrap metal in the mistaken belief that it had good title to them, 
the insured “at all times acted in a deliberate and purposeful manner,” it 
“intended to damage the railcars . . . ” and it did just that.104 
This response, however, is unsatisfactory because it purports to 
identify the insured’s intent without reference to the insured’s beliefs about 
the material circumstances of his action that are part of that intention.  In 
each case, the insured acted with a belief as to its legal rights (that the 
buyer of the trucks had defaulted on its loan, that the sellers of the borrow 
material and railcars had good title to the property).  The champion of the 
Maxim takes those beliefs to be distinct from, or merely ancillary to, the 
insured’s intent rather than being an essential part of that intent.  This is an 
error.  In each case the court credits the insured’s claim that in fact it acted 
on that mistaken belief; these are not cases in which the alleged mistake is 
not credited as being true.  In each case, then, the insured’s action cannot 
be explained apart from and without including that mistaken belief; but for 
the mistake the insured would not have acted intentionally as it did.  A man 
may desperately want an ice cream cone but that want alone does not 
explain why he walked into an ice cream shop.  For that explanation, we 
also must know that he believed that he could buy an ice cream cone in that 
shop.105  An actor’s belief about the material circumstances in which the 
actor is acting or about to act, is not, then, distinct from intentionality, but 
rather is an essential component of it, along with desires.  Because the 
 
 101. Red Ball Leasing, Inc., 915 F.2d at 309. 
 102. Id.; see id. at 311–12. 
 103. Argonaut Southwest v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1973). 
 104. Macon Iron & Paper Stock Co. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. 
Ga. 2012). 
 105. DAVIDSON, supra note 28, at 3–8. 
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description of an action can include, and typically does include, some of 
the circumstances in which the actor is acting,106 his beliefs as to those 
circumstances, whether correct or mistaken, are properly viewed as beliefs 
about the action itself, and not just something (circumstances or 
consequences) external or extrinsic to it. 
Second, the Red Ball Court’s direct causation theory only recognizes 
the intervening act of a third person or the intervention of an “extrinsic 
force” as possible events that could “convert” an intentional act into an 
accident.  But that theory is viable only if the Complete Control assumption 
is applicable, and in this case it is not.  Moreover, while insurance coverage 
courts commonly refer to “extrinsic” forces and events, we would do well 
to ask by what criterion is “extrinsic-ness” to be determined.  In Red Ball, 
the insured’s accounting system erroneously indicated that the buyer had 
defaulted.  Why isn’t human error in entering information into a computer 
or computer-generated misinformation an “extrinsic” concurrent or 
intervening cause?  What standard declares that it is not and why must that 
standard be adopted? 
Moreover, what is so special about “extrinsic” causes that gives them 
special status over “intrinsic” or “internal” causes, such as we may classify 
mistaken belief?  Extrinsic causation is not an essential element of the 
Causation Exception to the Maxim or of a theory of direct causation.  In the 
leading California case adopting the Maxim and the direct causation theory, 
Merced Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mendez,107 the Court stated the Causation 
Exception as: “an ‘accident’ exists when any aspect of the causal series of 
events leading to the injury or damage was unintended by the insured and a 
matter of fortuity.”108  As stated, the Causation Exception is sufficiently 
broad to include mistaken belief.  The insured-actor cannot intend to be 
mistaken, or know or believe herself to believe something false, and so her 
mistaken belief is “unintended . . . and a matter of fortuity.”  That mistaken 
belief is an “aspect of the causal series of events leading to the injury or 
damage”  but for that belief she would not have done what she did.  In 
short, “externality” or “extrinsically” is not required by the Causation 
Exception or the theory of direct causation and it is arbitrary to insert such 
a requirement into the Exception or the theory.109 
 
 106. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 107. 261 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 108. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).  See also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 109. The idea that a fortuitous cause or event must be “extrinsic” or “external” is commonly found 
in first-party property insurance case law, which traditionally has held that “intrinsic” or “internal” 
defects in a product or chattel were not fortuitous.  Professor Abraham explains that the “internal-
cause” exclusions in first-party property policies (e.g., exclusions for loss resulting from latent and 
design defects, inherent vice, mechanical breakdown, and ordinary wear and tear) “reflect the heritage 
of property insurance as peril-based coverage.  When property breaks down, ceases to function, or 
  
336 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
In sum, advocates of, and courts that adopt the Maxim, view causation 
as being of only two kinds: (a) the direct causation of an intentional act in 
which the actor exercises complete control over her action and (b) 
causation consisting of an intentional act plus an “extrinsic,” “external,” or 
“independent” event that is a concurrent or intervening cause.  Under the 
alternative pluralistic theory of action, causation is of three kinds, namely, 
kinds (a) and (b) above, plus (c) the “internal” causation of misfires due 
either to mistaken belief or improper execution (mistake in performance).  
As I will discuss in the following Section, the “internal” causation of 
misfires is entirely consistent with the fortuity requirement, given the 
appropriate evidentiary predicates.  There is no sound reason a priori or 
grounded in the insurance doctrine of fortuity to reject “internal” causation 
as a legitimate source of fortuity in intentional action. 
When actions misfire they can be truly described as both intentional 
(voluntary) and accidental (less than fully voluntary).  Judicial rejection of 
misfire analysis on the ground that intentional acts cannot be “transformed” 
into accidents is conceptually misguided from the start.  In addition, 
whether misfire analysis applies in any particular case is a matter of the 
evidence, not a matter of a general rule.  Misfire analysis further illustrates 
the problems with the theory of direct causation that informs the Maxim; an 
“extrinsic,” “external,” or “independent” cause is not a necessary condition 
for an intentional act to be an accident. 
 
 
V. MISTAKEN BELIEF MISFIRES, “ACCIDENT,” AND FORTUITY 
 
merely deteriorates, loss has occurred without the occurrence of any evident peril.”  Abraham, supra 
note 38, at 784–85.  Beyond this historical explanation for the presence of such exclusions in first-party 
policies, these exclusions allow insurers to decrease the probability that they will cover losses resulting 
from the low quality of the property insured, and thus allow insurers to avoid the adverse selection that 
may result when an insured purchases property of below-average quality and insures it for that reason 
or for more than those whose property is of average or higher quality.  Id. at 785.  That rationale, 
however, permits us to draw only an attenuated connection between internal-cause exclusions and the 
fortuity requirement.  The “internal cause” exclusions do not bar coverage for all losses resulting from 
internal causes, but generally only those losses to the property itself and only if the losses are caused 
exclusively by the internal deficiency.  Id. at 785–86.  If a commercial freezer malfunctions because of 
a design defect, the loss of the freezer typically would not be covered, but the loss to the food products 
it makes or stores would be covered.  Id. at 786. 
There are obvious conceptual parallels between the historical rejection of internal causes as 
fortuitous in first-party property coverage disputes and the notion in third-party liability coverage case 
law that only an “extrinsic” or “external” cause can convert an intentional act into an accident. 
 Whatever may be the merits of this limitation in the first-party context, my contention is that it is not 
appropriate in the third-party liability context at issue in this article.  Moreover, to the extent that some 
first-party coverage is available when losses are caused by a so-called “internal cause,” that suggests 
that the search, in third-party liability coverage disputes, for an “extrinsic,” “independent,” or “external” 
cause as the only type of causal factor that allows us to regard some intentional acts as accidents is too 
strong a requirement even should one find the first-party “peril-based” doctrine persuasive. 
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The foregoing analysis of mistaken belief misfires implies the 
compatibility between intentional action, on the one hand, and the fortuity 
requirement and common definitions of “accident” adopted by courts, on 
the other hand.  In this Section I shall argue for this important conclusion in 
further detail.  If this conclusion is correct, then it provides another reason 
why the Maxim is a legal error that should be scrapped. 
In cases of mistaken belief where the mistake is credited as fact, when 
the act is described in such a way as to expressly or implicitly incorporate 
the mistake, then the act-so-described is an “accident” because it satisfies 
one or more of the common definitions of the term.  It is, to quote a leading 
California case, “an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or 
consequence from either a known or unknown cause” and is “something 
out of the usual course of events . . . which happens suddenly and 
unexpectedly and without design.”110  The host of cases arising out of 
alleged acts of trespass and/or conversion provides a useful illustration of 
this point.  In the typical insurance coverage fact pattern for such cases, the 
insured-actor’s argument for coverage is that he (mistakenly) believed that 
he had legal rights to possess or have access to some chattel or real 
property, that he intended only to do an action consistent with those rights, 
and that, accordingly, his intentional act was an accident.  Courts adopting 
the Maxim routinely, and incorrectly, reject such arguments. 
In Argonaut Southwest v. Maupin, for example,111 the insured truly 
believed that it had a contractual right to remove borrow material from a 
parcel of land.  Accordingly, its act could be properly described as 
“intentionally exercising my contractual right to move the borrow 
material,” which is coverage-neutral because the act-so-described is not a 
cause of (actionable) injurious effects to a third party.  When the act is 
described to reflect the actual facts, e.g., “trespass and/or conversion of the 
borrow material (because the other contracting party was not the true owner 
and had no authority to sign the contract for the removal of the material),” 
the insured could truly say, “yes, I now (ex post) understand I did that, but I 
did not know I was doing that and I did not intend to do that.”  He may 
further add, accurately, even if somewhat artificially, “I did that without 
intent, foresight, expectation, or design  it was an accident and fortuitous 
from my perspective.  I had no intent to do an act (or cause a loss) that 
activated the insurer’s duties to defend or indemnify.”  From the insured’s 
perspective, the happening of a trespass or conversion of the borrow 
 
 110. Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 111. Argonaut Southwest v. Maupin, 500 S.W. 2d at 633.  
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material was fortuitous, and not a certainty caused by his action as he 
intended and understood it when acting, and not an event over which he 
had complete control.  The insured did not intend (expect, foresee, etc.) to 
turn a coverage-activating event that was otherwise contingent from his 
perspective and that of the insurer into a certainty by virtue of his action.112  
His action, then, was both fortuitous and accidental (from the insured’s 
point of view and from an insurance-as-a-contractual-relation perspective) 
and intentional (since the insured acted with intent).  The same analysis 
applies to virtually all of the many trespass and conversion cases in which 
the courts have rejected misfire analysis and applied the Maxim to deny 
coverage.113 
Some courts have attempted to avoid this conclusion by rejecting 
mistaken belief as to the “legal significance of a particular act” as a ground 
for describing the insured’s act as an accident.  In Macon Iron & Paper 
Stock Co. v. Transcontinental Insurance Co.,114 the insured cut up railcars 
to use as scrap metal in the mistaken belief that the seller, the General 
Manager of the railroad, had the authority to sell the railcars.  In the 
railroad’s subsequent action for conversion and other torts, and in the 
coverage litigation, the defendant-insured argued mistake as to ownership 
of the railcars.  The Court rejected the claim that a mistake as to the “legal 
significance of a particular act” could permit an act to be an accident within 
the insuring agreement of a CGL policy in conclusory fashion: “Plaintiff 
intended to damage the railcars  it was cutting them up for use as scrap 
metal.  This action may have been due to a mistake as to ownership, but 
there was nothing ‘accidental’ about it.”115  The Court fails to provide any 
argument as to why a mistake as to “legal significance” or the property 
rights of a third party is not a mistake as to a material circumstance of an 
action that constitutes a misfire and permits the action to be described as an 
 
 112. See Knutsen, supra note 35, at 236, 238, 243 (making a similar point with respect to intended 
losses). 
 113.  See, e.g., Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(Georgia law) (conversion of scrap metal; incorporating and relying on the entire opinion of the court in 
Macon Iron & Paper Stock); Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 311 
(7th Cir. 1990) (Indiana law) (conversion of trucks); Cap. City Ins. Co. v. Forks Timber Co., No. CV 
511–039, 2102 WL 3757555, at *6 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (Georgia law) (conversion of timber); Macon Iron 
& Paper Stock Co. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 1999) 
(conversion of railcars); Brazoswood Nat’l Bank v. Fid. Deposit Co. of Md., No. 14-97-00129-CV, 
1998 WL 30166 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1998) (conversion of equipment and accounts receivable); 
Thomason v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957) (Ala. law) (trespass on land). 
 114. Macon Iron & Paper Stock Co. v. Transcontinental Insurance Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (M.D. 
Ga. 1999); accord Cap. City Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3757555, at *5–6  (citing Macon Iron & Paper Stock 
favorably and rejecting the argument that the insured’s mistake as to the “unexpected legal 
consequences” of his action, i.e., conversion of timber), rather than the “unintended real consequences,” 
permitted the intentional action of harvesting timber to be described as an accident). 
 115. Id. at 1375. 
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accident.  Notwithstanding the catchy lyrics of an ‘80s pop song,116 we 
don’t just live in a material (physical) world; it is also a world full of social 
and legal relations that constitute the material (in the legal sense of the 
term) circumstances of our actions, and indeed, of many of our most 
important actions.  There is no reason why these social and legal relations 
should not count in coverage analyses of actions that misfire due to 
mistaken belief. 
Misfires due to mistaken belief also are entirely consistent with 
fortuity when legal relations are not implicated.  In the case of State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (Wright),117 the insured, in the midst 
of an argument, intentionally picked up the underlying plaintiff and threw 
him into a swimming pool, with the intent that the plaintiff get wet but with 
no intent to injure the plaintiff.  The insured, however, did not throw the 
plaintiff out far enough into the water; the plaintiff landed on the pool’s 
concrete steps and sustained a serious injury.  The insured’s act “misfired” 
either as a result of a mistaken belief or improper execution or both.  The 
Court describes the misfire as a mistaken belief as to causation: “[the 
insured] miscalculated one aspect in the causal series of events, namely, the 
force necessary to throw [the plaintiff] far enough into the pool so that he 
would land in the water.”118  Thus the insured’s misfired intentional act was 
described by the Court as “throwing too softly so as to miss the water” and 
the act, so described, “was an unforeseen or undesigned happening or 
consequence and thus was fortuitous.”119  In other words, the act was an 
accident.  At the same time, the Court described the act as an intentional 
act: “he deliberately picked up [the plaintiff] and threw him in the pool.”120  
Alternatively, the act that the insured intended could be described narrowly 
(without regard to its effects) as an intentional act  “[I intended to] throw 
him into the middle of the pool”  or as an accident  “I threw him on 
the concrete steps [but did not intend to].”  The bracketed phrases are 
designed to show that the act was intentional under the first description and 
was an accident under the second description. 
 
 116. MADONNA CICCONE, LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD (Sire Records 1984). 
 117. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (Wright), 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008).  Consistent with the California courts’ adoption of the Maxim and general rejection of the 
misfire analysis I have proposed here, Wright has not been followed by any other California case and 
has been criticized by later California appellate courts as “‘in variance’ with the California rule that 
‘accident’ refers to ‘the nature of the act giving rise to liability; not to the insured’s intent to cause 
harm.”’  State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Frake, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 312–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (Bourguignon), 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 537–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010)).  For reasons stated in the text, I submit that these criticisms are misguided. 
 118.  Id. at 836. 
 119. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 120. Id. 
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When an actor acts under a mistaken belief as to a circumstance of her 
action or its consequences that is material to coverage under the policy, she 
lacks complete control (and lacks effective control to some lesser or greater 
extent) over her action and does not act with the intent to cause the event 
that activates the insurer’s duties under the policy.  That is, her intentional 
act is also accidental and fortuitous (and every bit as fortuitous as when 
something “extrinsic” has a role in causing the event that activates the 
insurer’s duties, if not more so).  In acting on such a mistaken belief, the 
insured acts intentionally, but she does not intend to do an act that activates 
the insurer’s duties. 
To illustrate this abstract point concretely, suppose we change the 
prosaic example of my mistakenly spilling the coffee in my mug to a more 
coverage-significant example of a worker mistakenly spilling toxic waste 
from barrels.  The worker may intend to spill the liquid from the barrel onto 
the ground, but does not intend to spill toxic waste, because he mistakenly 
believes the liquid in the barrel is nontoxic (he believes it is rainwater or 
has been properly treated, etc.).  His action can be truly described both as 
intentionally spilling liquid from the barrels and as nonintentionally 
(accidentally or fortuitously) discharging toxic waste (or causing property 
damage).  He did intend to “spill the nontoxic liquid in the barrels” or “spill 
rainwater from the barrels,” and his act so described would not activate the 
insurer’s duties if that is in fact what the insured did.  He did not intend to 
“discharge toxic waste” (or “cause property damage”), and it is that act that 
happened and that activated the insurer’s duties.121  There is no 
asymmetrical information or belief on which the insured acts contrary to 
the basis of its bargain with the insurer.  Because his mistaken belief is 
coverage-neutral, that is, it would not activate the insurer’s duties if it were 
true and acted on, the insured has no intent to make happen the event that 
activates the insurer’s coverage obligations.  His action, then, is both 
intentional (under one true description) and does not conflict with the 
fortuity requirement, because he does not intend to do the coverage-
activating act or to cause it.  We can state this point as a general rule: In 
those instances, in which an insured acts on a mistaken belief and such an 
act (described with reference to the mistake) would not activate a duty of 
the insurer under the policy, then the insured does not violate the fortuity 
requirement, the act is an “accident” within the meaning of occurrence- and 
accident-based insuring agreements, and coverage should be forthcoming 
(subject to other policy terms).  There is nothing in the fortuity requirement 
 
 121. See Salmond, supra note 24, at § 134, at 414 (“To trespass on A’s land believing it to be one’s 
own is not a willful wrong.  The trespasser intended, indeed, to enter upon the land, but he did not 
intend to enter upon the land of A.  His act was unintentional as to the circumstances that the land 
belonged to A.”). 
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that demands that coverage be denied in such cases of mistaken belief.122 
This analysis of misfires due to mistaken belief also aligns nicely with 
the fortuity requirement considered in Section III.A.2 above.  Under New 
York’s insurance statute, a “fortuitous event” is defined as “any occurrence 
or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a 
substantial extent beyond the control of either party.”123  In cases of action 
on mistaken belief as to a material circumstance or aspect of the action, 
where such an action activates the insured’s duties under the policy, the 
mistake takes the insured’s action “to a substantial extent” beyond his 
control, where “control” refers not only to the insured’s physical power but 
also to his corresponding cognitive state in directing and guiding his action 
to produce a desired outcome.  Such actions, e.g., spilling of toxic waste 
from a barrel, are, moreover, “assumed by the insured to be” beyond his 
control because he (mistakenly) believed that he only had the power to spill 
the contents of the container that were not toxic waste.124  A similar 
analysis applies with respect to the definition of a “fortuitous event” found 
in the Restatement of Contracts.125  From the perspective of the insured, an 
action done on a mistaken belief is “dependent on chance”; the action 
described with respect to the mistaken belief, e.g., spilling the toxic waste, 
is (a) outside the actor’s effective control (but for the mistake he would not 
have done the action), and (b) unknown to the insured-actor until his belief 
is corrected (since an actor cannot be mistaken and know he is mistaken at 
the same time, and cannot intend to be mistaken). 
Fortuity is lacking “when the thing to be done [by one party, the 
insurer] is supposed to depend on the will of the other party [the insured]    
. . . .”126  In an insured’s action on a mistaken belief, the activation of the 
insurer’s duties does not depend on “the will”  i.e., the intention  of the 
insured, since the insured did not “will” (intend) to do the act that activates 
those duties, though in fact he did that act intentionally (under another 
description).  He nonintentionally or accidentally did the coverage-
activating act (spilling the toxic waste) while at the same time doing the 
 
 122. The insured’s assertion that he did act on a mistaken belief is always subject to testing against 
the evidence, of course.  The rule does not require acceptance of the insured’s assertion of mistake ipse 
dixit. 
 123. MCKINNEY’S INS. LAW, supra note 39. 
 124. An identical analysis applies when we consider an insurance contract as an aleatory contract, 
one that contains a “promise conditional on the happening of a fortuitous event, or event supposed by 
the parties to be fortuitous.”  See Stempel, supra note 24 and accompanying text.  An action that 
misfires due to the actor’s mistaken belief as to a material circumstance of his action is “an event 
supposed by the parties [and specifically by the insured] to be fortuitous.”  Id.   
 125. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 126. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983) (“Aleatory Contract”); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (10th ed. 2014). 
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same act with a different, coverage-neutral intention (intending to spill the 
rainwater).  Moreover, in such a misfire, there is no information (or belief) 
asymmetry that the insured actor can exploit to transfer to the insurer a loss 
(or risk of loss) that the insurer would not have accepted if it had the same 
information (belief) as the insured actor.  The basis of the insurance bargain 
is preserved when the insured’s act misfires.127 
Courts that reject misfires arising out of mistaken belief as 
inconsistent with fortuity effectively reject the notion that fortuity is to be 
assessed from the insured actor’s subjective point of view.  More 
particularly, they reject her cognitive state (her actual beliefs) and also 
reject her appetitive or conative state (her desire or want to perform this 
action, rather than the action she in fact performed).  At a minimum, this 
rejection is inconsistent with many of those same courts’ rule that 
“accident” is to be determined from the insured’s point of view.128  It is also 
inconsistent with the blackletter rule that fortuity is to be determined from 
the point of view of the parties to the insurance contract, and especially 
from the point of view of the insured.129 
If the preceding arguments are correct, the Maxim must be rejected.  
Intentional acts are not as a general matter or necessarily inconsistent with 
the fortuity requirement.  To the extent that there is still cognitive 
resistance to this conclusion, I suggest that it is, in part, a remnant of an 
understanding of fortuity as a function of the happening of physical events 
such as the unexpected icing of a road or a storm at sea.  That physicalistic 
approach is clearly part of the theory of direct causation and the Causation 
Exception to the Maxim.  On this theory, intentional acts are like cue balls 
that send their effects into the world (4-ball into the corner pocket) unless 
deflected from their course by an “extrinsic” intervening or concurrent 
cause (a ricocheting 9-ball), in which case the intentional act is deemed to 
be an “accident.”  While this “billiard ball” theory of causation may be 
useful and appropriate in many instances, there is no reason to believe that 
 
 127. I submit that the same considerations that show that misfires due to mistaken belief exhibit 
both fortuity and intentionality can also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to improper performance 
misfires.  But the argument for that assertion must be left for a later effort. 
 128. See supra note 27. 
 129. See supra Section III.A.2.  This rejection also does not comport with the reasoning embodied 
in the majority rule adopted by the Injurious Effects Only school, that is, that whether injurious effects 
are expected or intended — that is, not fortuitous — is to be determined according to the subjective 
point of view of the insured.  See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072 
(Fla. 1998); Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gamache, 686 N.E.2d 989 (Mass. 1997); Hecla Mining Co. v. 
N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 1991); City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 
F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1989).  See also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 5.4(c) at 511 (endorsing 
the subjective approach); Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not 
Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 76 nn. 51–52 (2012) 
(the subjective standard is the majority rule) (citing numerous cases). 
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it is well-suited for the analysis of liability insurance coverage disputes, 
that it exhausts the possible applications of the concept of fortuity, or that it 
comports with, let alone is required by, the pluralistic understanding of 
intentional action that I have articulated here. 
 
VI. THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE MAXIM 
 
If I am correct in concluding that the Maxim must be rejected as a 
general rule, the obvious question then is:  what is the alternative rule?  
Broadly, there are two options.  The first option is to reject the premise of 
the Causative Acts school that “accident” refers to the causative act and not 
the injurious effects of such an act.  That would lead to the adoption of one 
of the interpretations of “accident” employed by the Injurious Effects Only 
school.130  I shall not explore that option further.  The other option is to 
maintain the Causative Acts view that “accident” refers to the causative act 
independent of intended effects and, if possible, to formulate a rule 
consistent with that approach that is not burdened with the deficiencies of 
the Maxim.  I shall explore this second option here, assuming arguendo the 
appropriateness of the Causative Acts approach. 
In those cases, in which an act can truly be described as either 
intentional or accidental, an occurrence- or accident-based insuring 
agreement places before the court the question which description applies.  
The starting point in answering that question must be the very same 
language of the insuring agreement at issue.  A defining feature of 
occurrence- and accident-based liability insuring agreements is that they 
provide that an accident be the cause of injurious effects of which the third 
party complains.131  The first inquiry under such agreements, then, is 
whether the act can be described as an accident and thus is within the grant 
of coverage.  The first question is not, as advocated by proponents of the 
Maxim,132 whether the act can be described as intentional and thus outside 
the grant of coverage.  To ask as an initial matter whether the act is 
intended by the insured, where an affirmative answer would take the act 
outside of the coverage grant before one ever gets to the question of 
whether the act can also be described as an accident, is to treat the grant of 
coverage as an exclusion.  This is to stand the proper coverage analysis on 
its head.133  There is no intentional act exclusion in post-1966 standard 
 
 130. See, e.g., French, supra note 129, at 76-79; see also supra notes 10-12 and the authorities cited 
therein.  
 131. See supra Section II. 
 132. See, e.g., Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“the 
term “accident” refers to the insured’s intent to commit the act giving rise to liability. . . .”). 
 133. See generally Schinner v. Gundrum, 833 N.W.2d 685, 693 (Wis. 2013); Capstone Bldg. Corp. 
  
344 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
form occurrence- and accident-based CGL policies, and a fortiori, no such 
exclusion is to be found in their insuring agreements.  Rather, there is only 
express exclusionary language for injurious effects “expected or intended 
from the standpoint of the insured.”134  The Maxim, however, effectively 
rewrites these types of policies to include an intentional act exclusion in the 
policies’ grant of coverage.135 
Once one has identified an act that is properly described as an 
accident, the next step in the decision procedure mandated by the accident-
cause-injuries insuring language is whether that act so described is a cause 
of covered injuries to the interests of a third party.  Courts that adopt the 
Maxim (and the insurers who advocate it to the courts) have yet to explain 
why only the term “accident” in the insuring agreement is the relevant 
focus of the coverage decision procedure.  They cannot explain this 
because the terms of the insuring agreement ask a broader question  
whether there is an accident that is the cause of covered injurious effects 
for which the underlying plaintiff seeks a remedy.  Questions (and 
disputes) under liability insurance policies arise only if a third party claims 
that the insured’s actions (or the actions of someone for whom the insured 
is legally liable, say, under a theory of vicarious liability)136 were a cause of 
his injury.137  Without such injurious effects, the insured’s action would not 
give rise to any coverage questions and, from a coverage perspective, 
would be a nullity (as most actions commonly are because they do not 
result in injurious effects that give rise to a coverage claim, e.g., when I am 
jostled in a crowded elevator by a fellow passenger).  (Similarly, when the 
insured’s action is described more inclusively to refer to its properties that 
 
v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 974 (Conn. 2013); Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., 137 P.3d 486, 490 (Kan. 2006); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 571, 
576 (Neb. 2004). 
 134. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Moulton, 464 So.2d 507, 509 (Miss. 1985) (“There is no express disclaimer 
in the policy for acts ‘intentionally’ done . . .”); 21 HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D, INSURANCE 
LAW & PRACTICE § 132.2[A] (2006) (“Moreover, the new 1986 ‘intentional injury’ exclusion excludes 
an intentional ‘injury’ rather than an intentional ‘act.’  Consequently, this ‘intentional injury’ exclusion 
does not exclude liability insurance protection of an insured who commits an intentional act, unless the 
consequences (harm) of the act was either intended or expected from the standpoint of the insured.”); 
Id. at § 132.2 [B](2). 
 135.  My argument here does not depend upon the blackletter rule of construction that insuring 
agreements are to be interpreted broadly.  See, e.g., S. Plitt et al., 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:31, nn. 
2–3 (3d ed. 2010) (stating the blackletter rule that insuring agreements are to be broadly construed in 
favor of coverage).  Rather, my argument is that independent of that rule and, further, independent of 
any position on whether the term “accident” is ambiguous, if one does not begin by asking whether 
there is a basis for the act in question to fall within the grant of coverage (for it to be described as an 
accident), then there is no grant of coverage, or only a weak and nearly vacuous one. 
 136.  See supra note 63 and the cases and authorities cited therein. 
 137.  Events that are not actions of the insured or anyone else may also be an accident for which a 
third party seeks to hold the insured liable.  We can ignore this refinement here. 
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are neither accidental nor casually related to injurious effects that are 
covered under the insuring agreement, that broader description is not 
coverage relevant.) 
A champion of the Maxim may object that this focus on the causal 
relation between an accident and the injurious effects is unnecessary.  
There is no need to look at the causation issue if the act is intentional, 
because in that case there is no accident and no coverage ab initio, by 
virtue of the Maxim.  This, however, turns the proper coverage analysis 
upside down, as just discussed.  To sharpen this point, the salient question 
cannot be whether the insured intended to do the act simpliciter.  The 
answer to that will always be in the affirmative, since by definition an act is 
intentional under one or more descriptions.138  As one jurist noted, without 
a hint of criticism or irony, in commenting on Mississippi’s application of 
the Maxim, “the test to determine if the insured’s actions were intentional 
is whether the insured intended the action, not the consequences of the 
action.”139  This “test” is a tautology, and hence will always be satisfied for 
any action.  There will always be some description under which the action 
is intentional, and quite often, when intent to do the act is the criterion for 
the act description, many such descriptions.140 
Finally, it is important in the decision procedure to recognize that the 
insuring language instructs us that, although it is possible and not 
uncommon to describe an act broadly to include its effects,141 those 
descriptions are not coverage-relevant.  Rather, the language requires us to 
treat the injuries for which the third-party plaintiff seeks a remedy as 
consequences distinct from the insured’s action, such that a coverage 
relevant act description will describe the act in terms of its accidental 
character and causal role in producing such distinct injurious effects. 
In sum, the salient insuring agreements require that an accident cause 
covered injurious effects (usually bodily injury or property damage) for 
which a thirdparty seeks to impose liability.  The first question in the 
coverage analysis under these grants of coverage, then, is whether (1) there 
is an aspect or property of the act in question that permits it to be truly 
described as an accident (because the actor lacked control over his action 
such that the act did not conform to his intent to some extent, whether due 
to a misfire or otherwise) and (2) there is a basis to show that the 
 
 138. See supra Section III.B.2. 
 139. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. OmniBank, 812 So. 2d 196, 203 (Miss. 2002) (Diaz, J., dissenting). 
 140. The Maxim wrongly assumes that an actor always acts only with one intention.  Examples to 
the contrary are easily found.  I may intend to drive in excess of the speed limit and intend to drive 
safely.  An insured may intentionally manufacture a product with a less costly material than specified 
and also intend to manufacture a safer product thereby.  In such multiple-intention cases, the Maxim 
offers no guidance or rule for the selection of the coverage-relevant intent or act description. 
 141. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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accidental-act to be the cause (in the right sense)142 of covered and 
complained-of injurious effects.  If the answer to both of these questions is 
in the affirmative, then that description of the act-as-accident-and-cause is 
the coverage-relevant act description.  In place of the Maxim, then, the first 
rule of decision of the Causative Acts school should be: 
 
Under an occurrence- or accident-based insuring 
agreement of a liability policy, if the act has an actual or 
alleged property (or properties) that allows us to describe it 
as an accident and the act-so-described has the right causal 
relation to the third party’s complained-of injuries that are 
within the insuring agreement, then that description is the 
coverage-relevant act description. 
 
Adoption of this rule as a general rule of decision, and rejection of the 
Maxim as a general rule of decision, should lead to fairer outcomes in 
coverage disputes and a more sound insurance coverage jurisprudence. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The concepts of intentional action and fortuity are central to the 
positions of those who hold that “accident” in occurrence-and accident-
based policies only requires fortuity in the injurious effects of the insured’s 
action (the Injurious Effects Only school) and those who hold that 
“accident” requires fortuity in the act that causes injurious effects to the 
interests of a third party (the Causative Acts school).  Yet despite the many 
cases and scholarly articles contributing to the debate between these 
schools, the participants by and large have been content to advance their 
positions with little recognition of the need for rigorous analysis of the 
concept of intentional action and the implications of that concept for the 
resolution of liability insurance coverage disputes.  In this article, I have 
attempted to advance the debate between these two schools by analysis of 
the theory of action that informs the Maxim and its corollary doctrines, the 
Complete Control assumption and the theory of direct causation.  If my 
critique of the Maxim is correct, then this rule has no sound justification in 
policy language, in the fortuity requirement, or in the theory of action that 
informs it, and moreover, it is contrary to the pluralistic theory of action 
best-suited to resolving liability insurance coverage disputes.  The 
alternative rule of decision I have articulated further confirms that the 
 
 142. The proper causal analysis is beyond the scope of this article.  The courts have offered various 
alternatives. 
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Maxim is not the only rule of decision available to the Causative Acts 
school.  Accordingly, the Maxim is a fundamental legal error that should be 
rejected as a general rule of decision untethered to any evidentiary 
predicate in a particular case. 
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